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"The individual body should be seen as 
the most immediate, the proximate 
terrain where social truths and social 
contradictions are played out, as well 
as a locus of personal and social 
resistance, creativity, and struggle." 
(Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1988,p.31) 
ABSTRACT 
The "new" reproductive technologies (NRTs) have gathered substantial 
momentum in recent years. 'Psychological' discourse on these techniques 
has tended towards uncritical preoccupation with intra-individual, 
constitutional factors, and has ignored the sociocultural, political and 
economic contexts of these practices. Within an inter-disciplinary, 
social-constructionist framework, this study presents a feminist critique 
of the NRTs in which they are argued to be biopsychosocially noxious to 
women. Modern biomedicine's appropriation and ownership of infertility as 
"disease" is argued to be consistent with the agendas of capitalism and 
patriarchy. Results of fieldwork within a particular medical setting are 
presented to develop a hermeneutic of the discursive interface between 
medical gatekeepers and the applicant 'patients' with whom they negotiate 
treatment. In a concluding section a dominant theme in gatekeepers' talk, 
"the well-being of the child", is ideologically analyzed; women-centered 
strategies are briefly discussed; and implications for the interface 
between psychology and reproductive technology are drawn. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is developed within a multi-disciplinary framework, methodologically 
informed by social psychology, sociology and medical anthropology. Utilizing 
discourse theory, its principal aim is a critical analysis of aspects of the 
dominant discourse on the "new" reproductive technologies (NRTs). 
Some preliminary definitions are called for. While the term 
technology" broadens to include contraception, "new reproductive 




reproduction, including artificial insemination by husband (AIH), artificial 
insemination by donor (AID), in-vitro fertilization (IVF), surrogate motherhood, 
surrogate embryo transfer, sex selection, and sex preselection, all of which are 
actually practised currently; together with techniques that may become feasible 
but are as yet unactualized, such as ectogenosis (artificial wombs) and cloning. 
I have drawn attention to the term "new" since this is a misnomer in the case of 
artificial insemination, a technique that apparently dates back 
fourteenth century (Small & Turksoy, 1985). All of the above terms are 
in a glossary at the back of this text. 
to the 
defined 
"Discourse" is an elusive, multiply-formulated construct, and for present 
purposes it will be used as detailed by Foucault in his The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1972). Very briefly, a discourse is defined as a regulated system of 
statements and the practices used to produce, appropriate and communicate these 
statements (Henriques, et al. 1984; Young, 1987). In this particular form of 
discourse analysis, the content, function and social significance of language 
are at issue (Kress, 1985). A discourse on an area of social life will define, 
describe and delimit what is possible and impossible to say with respect to it, 
and how it may be talked about (Ibid). In this sense reality is "socially 
constructed" (Berger and Luckman, 1966), and it is through discourse's 
simultaneous enablement and constraint of action and understanding that 
knowledge and power are linked (Young, 1987). Critical discourse analysis 
points to how language contributes to social inequality (Fowler, 1982), and 
confronts the role of state and institutions in authorizing, promoting and 
legitimating the particular forms of discourse that sustain these relations of 
domination (Van Dijk, 1982; Thompson, 1982). 
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LITERATURE SUMMARY 
In a precursor to the present study (Brokensha, 1986) a summary of the 
literature revealed that the legal, ethical and religious implications of AID 
had received considerable attention. It was noted that studies addressing the 
'psychology' of AID were focused around the following themes: 
i The psychological health of those requesting AID. 
ii Typical sequences of experiences undergone by recipient couples, 
and their attitudes. 
iii Whether or not the selection of recipients should involve 
psychological assessment. 
iv The advisability and nature of providing 
support for recipient couples. 
psychotherapeutic 
v The psychological sequelae of AID for recipients and offspring. 
vi Sperm donors' motivation and their attitudes. 
Literature on the 'psychological' aspects of AID revealed a preoccupation 
with intra-individual, constitutional factors; the search being for "the 
typical" donor or recipient. I proposed that this tendency could reflect an 
eagerness on the part of those providing AID to establish the respectability and 
normality of donors and recipients, in an effort to receive social sanction of 
such services. With these as the dominant terms in the 'psychological' 
discourse on AID, it was evident that no space had been given to the 
consideration of socio-cultural and political parameters. "Towards a 
Contextualist Understanding of AID" (Brokensha, 1986) was an attempt to redress 
this imbalance, and a medical anthropological framework was employed to 
elucidate some of the cultural bases of medical belief and action regarding AID. 
A study of the literature from 1985 to date on AID and other "new" reproductive 
technologies reveals that the field has expanded rapidly. In early 1984 the 
first successful results of egg donations by IVF; egg donations by lavage; and 
embryo freezing were reported. In an ethical review of 1984, entitled 
"Reproductive Technology Poses Perplexing New Problems", Gray (1985) commented: 
"The speed with which reproductive technology advanced last year was 
startling ... The new reproductive technologies are so novel that the 
terminology with which to discuss them doesn't yet exist." 
The increasing number and deployment of reproductive technologies has induced a 
corresponding convolution of legal, religious and ethical concerns, (eg. 
Andrews, 1987; Christiaens, 1988; Geller, 1986; Grobstein, 1985; Rapp, 1987). 
At the time of writing, for instance, a legal precedent was in the making during 
the first ever "frozen embryos divorce case", wherein a divorced couple fought 
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over custody of seven fertilized embryos they had frozen under IVF-treatment 
during their marriage. The woman sought to have the eggs reimplanted into her 
uterus against her ex-husband's wishes for them to remain frozen. The judge 
finally granted temporary custody to the mother in the "manifest best interests 
of the children". (Cape Times, 22/09/89). 
In the U.K., a 'Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and 
Embryology' had been appointed by the Conservative Government in 1982 to examine 
key issues in reproductive technology and make recommendations for practice. 
The Report of the Committee (the "Warnock Report") was published in 1984 and its 
recommendations adopted by the British medical fraternity. Similarly, in the 
United States the American Fertility Society "felt that (reproductive) 
technology was getting ahead of us. No one in the United States was taking a 
stand and establishing guidelines." (Ethics Committee member, Edward Warnock, 
quoted in Kolata, 1986.) The Ethics Committee of the Society thus released a 94 
page document, "Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies" in 
September 1986. 
In South Africa, NRT practices are informally guided by Britain's Warnock 
Report, and officially constrained by local legislation. The Human Tissue Act 
of 1983 for the first time legalized the donation of sperm and ova in this 
~ --------
country. An annexure to this Act (Department of National Health and Population 
Development, June 1986) stipulated that "no person except a medical practitioner 
or a person acting under his supervision may remove or withdraw a gamete from 
the body of a living person for the purpose of the artificial insemination of 




the artificial insemination of any person other than a married woman 
The Human Tissue Amendment Act, 1988 (Ibid., June 1988) broadens 
restrictions 
outlaws the 
to all artificial fertilization practices (not 
payment of donors (though loosely allowing for 
costs incurred), and provides stricter control of access to 




in all cases of 
gamete-donation to a (married) couple the resultant child becomes the legitimate 
offspring of that woman and her husband. 
Schaffer (1986) has observed that " at 
implications) are still so difficult to identify. 
present the (psychological 
And yet there is considerable 
apprehension among members of the mental health professions as to what is in 
store for them." (p. 772). The same preoccupations as noted above prevail in 
the literature dealing with the 'psychology' of AID and other RTs (eg. Berger, 
1986; Blaiser, Maloigne-Katz, & Gigon, 1988; Brand, 1987; Humphrey & Humphrey, 
1987; Leiblum, Kemmen, & Lane, 1987; Sokoloff, 1987). However, two new 
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tendencies are evident: 
Firstly, the RTs are now receiving attention from psychoanalysis. Huber 
and Bydlowski (1987), in discussing the "biopsychological problems created by 
the new procreation techniques", report that 
"Biologists and psychoanalysts are currently working together to 
determine the interfacing of such diverse approaches as the histology 
of human ovaries and the unconscious desires invested in the 
reproduction instinct." 
They go on to claim that "only psychoanalysis can reveal the mental processes 
underlying these new 'procreations' ... and the separation of the sexual drive 
from the self-propagation instinct" (Abstract). Tort (1987) has proposed that 
"the role of psychoanalysis" in AID" ... consists chiefly in defining and 
helping the subjects to internalize appropriate superego models" (Abstract). 
Secondly, several writers have sought to define the role of mental health 
professionals in relation to clinical and assessment aspects of the RTs: Bell 
(1986), Daniels (1986), Greenfeld, et al. (1986), and Needleman (1987) have all 
discussed the potential roles of Social Work in such cases. Richardson (1987), 
proposes a role for the psychiatric consultant in "evaluating the likely effect 
of AID on the family's integrity and stability" (Abstract); and Micioni, et al. 
(1987) describe their methods of assessing "doubtful and negative psychological 
indications for AID". 
Probably the most significant new development in the discourse on AID and 
related technologies has been a growing body of works that seek to make sense of 
these practices in terms of their sociocultural, political and economic 
contexts. In a 1987 supplement to the Hastings Centre Report, the interface 
between public debate and state policy on RT is examined in France, Israel, The 
Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Australia. (Bai, Shirai, and Ishii, 1987; de 
Wachter & de Wert, 1987; Fagot-Largeault, 1987; Gillon, 1987; Shapira, 1987; 
Waller, 1987. ) Dagnaud & Mehl (1988) explore gynecologists' relations with 
their patients and with public authorities and discuss the relationship between 
cultural changes and advances in RT Basker (1986) and Brody (1987) have drawn 
attention to the power held by physicians as arbiters, gatekeepers and 
decisionmakers in the reproduction of the infertile and pointed to their agency 
in social control. Robinson (1988) has sought to elucidate how the legal 
structure has been redefining familial relationships in response to the 
development and diffusion of reproductive technology. Vandelac (1986) suggests 
that medically assisted procreative techniques have given rise to "an entirely 
new economy of human reproduction" (Abstract) and, similarly, Gimenez (1988) has 
offered an historical materialist analysis of RT. 
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The following critical analysis of the NRTs proceeds by two distinct but 
interrelated means. Part I is devoted to the development of a selective 
feminist critique of the NRTs, in which I argue that these practices, in their 
present and projected forms, are physically, psychologically and politically 
noxious to women. Against this backdrop, Part II explores NRT discourse within 
a specific medical milieu, developing a hermeneutic of the discursive interface 
between medical gatekeepers and the involuntarily infertile people who petition 
for their services. In a concluding section, these particular, situated 
discursive features are made sense of in terms of the feminist critique, by 
analyzing their ideological function in legitimizing social discrimination. The 
direct implications of this analysis for psychology, especially clinical 
psychological practice, are briefly considered. 
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PART I : A FEMINIST CRITIQUE 
Reflecting the complex diversity of feminist theory in general, women-
centered discourse on the NRTs constitutes a non-unified field. Prevailing 
analyses are often competitive and mutually exclusive at quite fundamental 
levels. From the perspective of social constructionist theory (Gergen, 1985), 
which views all knowledge as the product of historically situated interchanges 
amongst people, the vicissitudes of feminist discourse may be seen to flow from 
a diversity of socio-political agendas. Utilizing a social constructionist 
framework, this section is aimed at developing a necessarily selective feminist 
critique of the NRTs. Specifically, I argue from a socialist feminist position 
(Eisenstein, 1979) that these practices are closely wedded to both partriarchy 
and capitalism and thus oppressive to women. 
In contrast to marxist feminism, which proposes a reductive relationship 
between women's oppression and class oppression, socialist feminism contends 
that women's freedom is predicated on the undoing of both capitalism and 
patriarchy, recognizing that these latter 
"function as a mutually dependent totality, (yet) also operate as 
differentiated and conflictual systems. As such they remain two 
systems that are relatively autonomous from each another, never 
totally separate today and yet always differentiated in purpose." 
(Eisenstein, 1982, p.92) 
Acknowledging this complex relationship between capitalism and patriarchy, I do 
not attempt to analyze how their symbiosis is played out within the NRTs. 
Rather more modestly, I point to some of the ways in which each of these obtains 
within the discourse under study, and how these forms are noxious to women. 
There is no generally accepted or rigorous definition of 'patriarchy', and for 
the purposes of this study it will be defined, in keeping with a trend in 
feminist anthropology, as "male dominance in general ... (including both) the 
absolute authority of the male in the domestic domain ... and male monopoly on 
public social discourse, political and economic decisions ... " (Seymour-Smith, 
1986). 
A Feminist Dilemma? 
The historic role of reproduction in the oppression of women suggests the 
need for careful appraisal of any new technology in this domain. However, at 
first glance it is not easy to discern whether feminism should welcome or defend 
against the NRTs. Several feminist writers have admitted with some discomfort 
to points of friction within their own discourse, points at which conflict 
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arises between two or more women-centered values, (e.g. Salladay, 1981; Murphy, 
1984; Minden, 1985; Rowland, 1985; Rapp, 1987). Notably, the broad question of 
whether and to what extent the NRTs should be permitted lands feminism on the 
"horns of a feminist dilemma" (Peterson, 1981, p.197). This is a double-bind 
commonly expressed in terms of women's unavoidably losing power, though this is 
formulated slightly differently across authors. Thus the potential of the NRTs 
to further subjugate women to patriarchal medical control is juxtaposed with 
their potentially beneficial therapeutic value (Holmes, 1981; Oakley, 1984), 
while from another perspective they are seen as potentially freeing women from 
reproduction yet removing the only value clearly granted to women by patriarchal 
society (Peterson, 1981; Salladay, 1981). And Powledge (1981) advocates the 
prevention of prenatal diagnosis on grounds that it is sexist, yet is reluctant 
to "provide an opening wedge for legal regulation of reproduction in general" 
(p.197). 
The preoccupation of feminism in the early 1970's was with women's 
liberation from the burdens of reproductive labour and hence at this time 
feminist health care interests were located outside of maternity (Oakley, 1984). 
The importance of effective contraception was in its transformation of 
involuntary reproductive labour into voluntary reproductive labour, an impact 
that has led to the notion that social and political change in the status of 
women is principally "technologically driven" (Kronenfeld & Whicker, 1986, 
p.47). This was the ideological climate within which de Beauvoir (1974) 
unquestioningly accepted the evaluation of childbirth as an inferior animal 
activity and the curse of femininity, and the radical feminist writer Firestone 
(1972) labelled pregnancy as "barbaric", advocating that women be emancipated 
from the "tyranny of reproduction by every means possible" (pp.188;193). 
Firestone optimistically viewed the NRTs as the sine qua non for women's 
freedom, and a wave of feminist science fiction reflected similar utopianism, 
notably the parthenogenetic societies in Russ' "The Female Man" (1975), Charnas' 
"Motherlines" (1978) and Gilman's "Herland" (1979). 
With hindsight, these views are naively biologistic. They are no longer 
fashionable, and have been displaced by the insight that it is not motherhood or 
even the family in themselves that are problematic, but the patriarchal 
institutionalization of these. (Rich; 1977; Friedan, 1981; Wishart, 1982). An 
adequate analysis must recognize the central social relations in operation, and 
appreciate their virulence - that is, their ability to remain unchanged across 
the vicissitudes of technology. 
It is a "technocratic illusion" that relations of oppression and exploita-
tion can be overcome by more sophisticated technology since this is only 
8 
possible by a revolutionizing of these relations (Mies, 1985); and it is naive 
to assume that women's appropriation of the NRTs would automatically eliminate 
their misuse. On the contrary, the projected radical feminist agenda of 
employing the NRTs to abolish men (Firestone, 1972) is apparently nothing other 
than a vengeful reversal of the oppression (Powledge, 1981). It is informed by 
a fallacious biologistic interpretation of what is in fact a social and 
historical relationship: "bisexuality as such is not our problem, but the 
relationship of exploitation and domination between men and women" (Mies, 1985, 
p.557). Thus as Rothman has put it, "all (RTs) empower and they all enslave, 
they can all be used by, for or against us" (1984, p.33, original emphasis), 
depending on the social relations they serve. Despite the distinctiveness of 
women's biological capacities, then, it is the historical and social context of 
childbearing and childrearing that principally determines their structure and 
meaning. 
Medicine's ownership of infertility 
The term "medicalization" has been used to describe the overproduction of 
'illness', as a social construction, in contemporary advanced industrial 
societies (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1988): 
"The proliferation of disease categories and labels in medicine and 
psychiatry, resulting in ever more restricted definitions of the 
normal, has created a sick and deviant majority ... Radical changes in 
the organization of social and public life in advanced industrial 
societies have allowed medicine and psychiatry to assume a 
hegemonic role in shaping and responding to human distress (and 
resulted in) the funnelling of defuse but real complaints into the 
idiom of sickness ... " (Ibid.,pp.26-27) 
Similarly, the concept of "ownership" has been used to refer to a group's 
authoritative ability to construct the public definition of a social problem 
(Gusfield & Weiner, 1975, 1980 in Parton, 1985). Biomedicine has not only 
medicalized (and to some extent pathologized) the normal female life processes 
of pregnancy and birth, reconstituting them as specialized, technical subjects 
("antenatal care" and obstetrics), but additionally asserted ownership of 
infertility by labelling this as "disease". Medicine's ownership of infertility 
sanctions shifting the focus of research from the later stages of pregnancy, 
over which successful control has now been achieved, to its beginnings. By 
influencing the release, fertilization and reimplantation of eggs in women's 
bodies, a predominantly male medical and scientific establishment is rapidly 
increasing its control over all aspects of the reproductive process. 
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An understanding of medicine's "technological takeover" of reproduction 
requires exploration of how such practices are ideologically imbedded. As Noble 
(1979) has argued: 
"There is always a range of possibilities or alternatives that are 
delimited over time - as some are selected and others denied -by the 
social choices of those with the power to choose, choices which 
reflect their intentions, ideology, social position, and relations 
with other people in society. In short technology bears the social 
'imprint' of its authors." (quoted in Koch & Morgall, 1987, p.173) 
Technology is thus a socially shaped institution, containing values implicit in 
its design. It gives control over lives - "biopower" (Foucault, 1979) and 
inevitably plays an instrumental role in the differential power relations 
between people. In this sense the NRTs are an instrument of the "body politic" 
-" ... the regulation, surveillance, and control of bodies ... in the service of 
some definition of collective stability, health, and social well-being" 
(Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1988, pp.7-8). Bush (1983) has developed a feminist 
model for technology assessment in which she stresses the concept of "advantage" 
technologies are accepted and promoted because they are advantageous to 
certain groups. Evaluating technology on the grounds of its differential social 
utility lays the basis for a "conflict-oriented" feminist analysis (Koch & 
Morgall, 1987). 
Although women are the principal consumers of reproductive technologies 
they are systematically excluded from decisions about their development and 
deployment. The practices surrounding these technologies are mystified and 
professionalized, placed under the jurisdiction of biomedicine. It must be 
conceded that to a large extent this is practically necessary in the case of 
more complex procedures such as IVF, which require sophisticated technical 
skill. Artificial insemination, however, preceded biotechnology, with a history 
extending as far back as the fourteenth century, when Arabs impregnated mares of 
their enemies with semen of 'inferior' stallions; the first documented human 
artificial insemination by husband being in 1793, and by donor in 1884 (Small & 
Turksoy, 1985). Artificial insemination is simple to the extent that the 
British Pregnancy Advisory Service provides a BPAS 'do-it-yourself kit' to 
facilitate self-impregnation of women (Samuels, 1982), while a recent study 
revealed no statistically significant difference in success rate between "home-
inseminations" carried out by the recipient's partner and those clinically 
performed (Hogerzeil, et al., 1988). Yet by resituating artificial insemination 
under the rubric "new reproductive technology", medicine has claimed custody of 
it. 
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Since in this case medicine has extended its control to a practice not 
predicated on specialized medical expertise, it is implied that the 
appropriation is ideologically impelled. More correctly, because of AI's 
simplicity, its ideological underpinnings are more transparent than those of 
other, actual, reproductive technologies, where social agendas are just as 
active but more difficult to unravel from technological mystique. 
As the custodian of AI and other RTs, medicine strictly controls who is 
granted access. In addition to a physical work-up, prospective recipients' 
social, economic, psychological and marital status are all brought under 
scrutiny to inform a final judgement as to whether they are deemed "fit for 
parenting". Thus a vast scope of non-medical considerations are employed as a 
basis for prescribing or prohibiting a medical treatment, extending medical 
jurisdiction into the realm of social control. In general, policies of access 
discriminate against poor women, black women, lesbians, and single women, though 
it should be noted that practices do vary internationally. In the Netherlands, 
for example, there is a trend to include celibate woman and lesbians (de Wachter 
& de Wert, 1987). 
"Social arrangements 
personal biases or 
arrangements become 
which can be used 
(Steinberg, 1986) 
now acquire a medical pathology and doctors' 
bigotry about the social value of those 
reclassified as objective medical evaluations 
to limit women's reproductive options " 
In this gatekeeping process, physicians act as moral arbiters, expressing their 
own standards of normality and deviance or those of the culture to which they 
are, perhaps unwittingly, captive (Brody, 1987). In a careful study of journal 
articles between 1980 and 1985, Basker (1986) sought to examine the dominant 
ethical considerations that were being raised in medical literature to 
potentially inform physicians' decisions and practices concerning 
technologically-assisted reproduction. S/he found that ethical issues were 
given minimal attention in the medical discourse, and that such attention was 
selective. 
"The issues the journals seem to ignore are those which call into 
question practitioners' judgement and motives, their ultimate 
authority, their capacity as gatekeepers, their control over their 
patients, the experimental nature of the procedures - issues which 
might be seen as threatening to some of the basic tenets of medicine." 
(p.238) 
The opinions appearing in the medical literature are predominantly written by 
males, for a male audience; and the conspicuous absence of any discussion of 
women-centered issues indicates the trivialization of these by the medical 
fraternity. 
11 
The physical risks to women 
Virtually absent from the dominant discourse is any discussion of the 
physical risks to which women are exposed as consumers of the NRTs. When it 
does appear, the 'physical risks' argument tends to be strategically invoked, 
for reasons that are not women-centered. In a careful feminist study of the 
Warnock Report, Spallone (1986) observes how the Enquiry Committee only draws 
attention to the physical risks of those methods they judge to be socially 
unacceptable. Ethical medical literature systematically ignores the significant 
proportion of infertility that is of iatrogenic origins (Basker, 1986) - notably 
that caused by previous tubal ligation (tied tubes) and pelvic infection induced 
by IUD's. This is an omission that cloaks the embarrassing irony of using 
reproductive technology to remedy that which it caused in the first instance. 
Similarly, the significant contribution to infertility of pesticides, 
herbicides, and hazardous environmental waste has been ignored. 
Some of the documented risks of the NRTs are as follows. Selective 
abortion following amniocentesis may only be performed in the second trimester 
of pregnancy, increasing the risks of maternal death (Nentwig, 1981). The 
'flushing' or 'lavage' technique employed in surrogate embryo transfer (SET) 
carries risks of infection and ectopic (tubal) pregnancy for both donor and 
recipient women, but in addition the possibility of a 'retained pregnancy' 
that is an unwanted pregnancy - when flushing fails, leaving the donor to either 
abort (spontaneously, if she is lucky) or carry to term. Risks entailed in IVF 
include adverse effects of hormonal hyperstimulation (to obtain the highest 
possible number of mature ova in one cycle); trauma to the ovary from multiple 
follicle puncture by laparoscopy; risks from anaesthesia with repeated 
operations; risks from procedures for monitoring IVF; increased risks of 
spontaneous abortion and multiple pregnancy (this is because of the practice of 
transferring multiple embryos in order to raise the probability of a successful 
implantation); potential damage to the uterus; and risk of ectopic pregnancy 
(Hynes, 1985; in Kock & Morgall, 1987; Brody, 1987). 
In a recent editorial in the Journal of In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo 
Transfer, Meldrum (1989) has expressed concern at" ... the casual approach to 
sterile techniques during the transvaginal aspiration of follicles by many using 
this method of oocyte harvest" (p.1), and cites a case of serious infection by 
this procedure in which a 32 year old woman had to undergo removal of her 
uterus, tubes, and ovaries. 
The mitigation that these are risks taken in order to bypass reproductive 
dysfunction in the woman flies in the face of the increasingly enthusiastic 
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application of IVF to cases of unknown aetiology and to cases of positively 
diagnosed male-factor infertility. At the University of Goettingen, when 
confronted with vexing cases of "unexplained sterility" which "can be the result 
of either psychosomatic factors or anatomic-physiological misfunctions", 
standard practice is to perform a so-called "diagnostical IVF". (Hinney, Kuhn, 
& Michelman, 1985. Abstract). They take successful in vitro fertilization (qua 
fertilization) as a basis for further intrauterine insemination cycles combined 
with psychotherapy, but conclude that "if there is no fertilization of the 
oocytes [eggs] in at least two IVF cycles even psychosomatic [sic] attempts to 
fulfill the patient's desire for a child seems senseless." (Ibid.) 
When the liabilities of IVF, in terms of cost, physical risks, and minimal 
efficacy already call into question its status as a 'therapy', its deployment as 
a diagnostic tool seems outrageously unjustified - particularly since the odds 
are equal that it will lead its managers to conclude that further investigations 
are "senseless". Such unwieldly usage would seem to reflect a feature of the 
biotechnical revolution described by Brody (1988) as "the perceived imperative 
of using any available technology to solve problems defined as medical without 
reflective definition of where the patient's best interest actually lies." 
(p.204) 
The 'success rate' of IVF may be expressed in a number of ways: per woman, 
per laparoscopy, or per embryo transfer; counting all pregnancies (including 
those ending in spontaneous abortion and tubal pregnancies) or only actual live 
births. Currently, in the United States, at least, no standard protocol exists 
for reporting IVF performance statistics (Stein, et al., 1989. Abstract). 
Collins et al. 1983, have also drawn attention to the existence of 'treatment-
independent' pregnancies - pregnancies that are incidental to technological 
intervention yet for which the technologists take credit. At the 'Sixth World 
Congress on IVF and Alternative Assisted Reproduction' in Jerusalem in April 
1989, 
figure 
a spokesperson for the WHO dismayed his audience by presenting 





On these grounds the WHO no longer recognizes IVF as an established therapeutic 
treatment. Rather, it is viewed in its present form as an experimental 
procedure. 
However, the increasing popularity of IVF as an intervention for positively 
diagnosed male-factor infertility is precisely due to its efficacy in this 
application. Data collected in 1987 by the U.S. IVF Registry reflects that IVF 
had higher success rates in male that in female-factor cases - 17% and 15% of 
* W. Wagner, W.H.O., 2100, Copenhagen, Dennark. Cited in personal c:orrmunication. 
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IVF patient cycles with tubal disease and endometriosis respectively, achieved 
clinical pregnancy; while 23% with oligospermia (low sperm count) resulted in 
clinical pregnancy (Hartz, Porter & Danforth, 1989. Abstract) 
Wolf (1989) writes: 
"Sperm processing in vitro to compensate for abnormal motility or 
abnormal acrosomal status is on the horizon. Ultimately it should be 
possible to effect fertilization in extreme male-factor cases The 
use of IVF to treat male infertility obviously has a bright future." 
(Abstract) 
Thus it is quite probable that IVF will be most commonly consumed by 
fertile women married to infertile men. Clearly the risks entailed for such 
women are considered to be less important than, (i) preserving the genetic 
relationship between husband and child. This link would be disrupted by the 
low-risk option of AID; and (ii) avoiding the trouble of repeated attempts at 
AIH, which boosts the husband's sperm but presumably does not afford the same 
degree of control over sperm that IVF does. It could be speculated that IVF 
presents a more 'challenging' option to biotechnicians than these low-tech (if 
not no-tech) alternatives. Again it appears that, in ambitious pursuit of the 
technologically innovative, biotechnicians allow careerism to precede needs-
assessment, particularly the needs of women. 
NRTs as commerce 
Notwithstanding the philanthropic intentions of its medical agents, the 
role of economic motive in the promotion of NRTs should not be minimized. Brody 
(1988) observes that "the biomedical research enterprise is central to the 
economies and reward systems of the industrialized world ... (offering) support, 
gratification and increased social power for a growing elite, the clinician 
scientist, and increasingly for the clinician-scientist-entrepreneur." (p.204) 
U.S. legislation's reticence in responding to the NRTs has left these wide 
open to economic exploitation under 'free enterprise'. It is estimated that in 
the U.S.A. during 1988, when the going rate for a completed IVF procedure (i.e. 
a single attempt) averaged $5 000, subfertile couples chanced $90 million in the 
hope that the technology would allow them to take home a child this year (Stein 
et al., 1989. Abstract). The technique of surrogate embryo transfer (SET) was 
not funded by the U.S. National Institute of Health, but by a profit based firm, 
"Fertility and Genetics Research Incorporated" (FGR), which has a policy of 
offering company shares to its researchers (Rowland, 1985). Market researchers 
hired by FGR to assess the availability of women willing to serve as regular egg 
donors reported that "donor women exist in cost-effective abundance" (quoted in 
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Morris, 1988, p.20). FGR applied for a patent on the instruments used in SET 
and on the process itself. Similarly, in 1984, Australia Monash University was 
arranging to sell in vitro technology to an American commercial company. These 
competitive ownerships prevent evaluation by outside researchers, and inhibit 
information on and availability of these as potential services (Annas, 1984). 
In the U.K., issues associated with health and reproduction are less 
blatantly exploited for profit than in the U.S. (Stacey, 1985), and the 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985 outlaws commercial surrogacy. Yet this 
restriction is being circumvented by a Washington-based agency which recruits 
British women to serve as surrogate mothers for British couples willing to pay 
up to $32 000, thus conducting the entire transaction outside the U.K. (Morris, 
1988). 
South Africa is considerably behind the U.S.A. and U.K. in the development 
and dissemination of NRTs and tight legislation prohibits the commercialization 
of gametes (see Introduction). Nonetheless, the costs of treatment are high, 
though fortunately for recipients these are either covered by medical aid or 
determined on a sliding scale. At Groote Schuur Hospital, drugs for hormonal 
hyperstimulation during IVF are supplied at cost - somewhere between R220 and 
R500. Separately, each IVF "attempt", which includes hospitalization for ovum 
pick-up and later again for embryo transfer, costs around R510 if fully charged. 
Considering that some patients undergo as many as eight or nine attempts, this 
translates into substantial cost. 
There is evidence of biases and straightforward misinformation within the 
medical literature, in the service of promoting NRT. For example, an article in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association (Blumberg, 1984) claiming that 
the 'non-surgical' procedure of embryo transfer by lavage is safer than IVF, was 
based on promotional material which the same author was paid to write under 
contract to the procedure's orginator and his team (Annas, 1984). 
comments: 
"One expects the professional literature to be somewhat more objective 
The article will probably seem balanced to most of JAMA's non-
legal readers, but it is biased in favour of SET Neither the 
author nor the editors of JAMA tell the readers that the author was 
paid by Dr Buster and his research team ... Thus what should have been 
presented in the professional literature as a brief in favour of SET 
is presented as an opinion of a neutral observer" (Ibid., p.26, 
quoted in Basker, 1986, p. 235) 
Annas 
In an editorial in Fertility and Sterility headed "The In Vitro Fertilization 
Pregnancy Rate: Let's be Honest with One Another", Soules (1985) has spoken out: 
"The truth 
procedures 
with regard to the expected pregnancy rate after IVF 
has been widely abused (primarily by IVF practitioners) 
and has tainted an otherwise meritorious record of scientific and 
clinical achievement The widespread practice of exaggerating the 
IVF pregnancy rate appears to be a market ploy to lure prospective 
infertile couples into becoming active IVF patients ... [it] amounts 
to deception and exploitation of patients and is deplorable." (p.512-
513) 
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The NRTs court what Rothman (1985; 1987) has called the "commodification 
of life", the process whereby people and their parts are treated as marketable 
commodities. The commodification process is most explicitly instantiated in the 
NRTs when money changes hands, but is also active at more subtle levels, often 
revealed quite vividly in the language surrounding these practices. It is 
evident in calculations of the "costs" and "burdens" of rearing disabled people, 
from which amniocentesis and selective abortion purportedly "saves" us (Rothman, 
1987). It is disclosed to us in terms such as "sperm bank"; in an RT pioneer's 
speculation that it might be possible in future to open an "embryo supermarket" 
(Corea, 1984, p.132). It is present in the description of a mature woman's 
ovaries as "a production line of eggs", egg removal as "egg harvesting", and the 
high number of unused eggs and automatically aborted embryos as "egg and 
embryonic wastage" (Edwards, Bavister & Steptoe, 1969. Quoted in Murphy, 1984, 
p.71) And Modell (1989), in a study of how the concept of "odds" appears as a 
recurrent rhetorical theme in the negotiation of IVF between doctor and patient, 
has noted how doctors frequently draw on metaphors of gambling - one physician 
comparing IVF to a "roulette wheel" (p.29). 
Motherhood, the family and the illusion of "choice" 
The NRTs have led to an interesting tension between two ideological 
components: on the one hand they facilitate fertility, while on the other they 
threaten the dissolution of the nuclear, patriarchal family. Indeed, it is 
possible these days to have up to five parents - an ovum donor, a sperm donor, a 
gestational ("surrogate") mother, a caretaking mother and a caretaking father. 
The need to systematize patrilineal inheritance has always 
preoccupations with legitimacy. In addition to compounding the 
generated 
age-old 
difficulties of establishing paternity, the NRTs potentiate alternative family 
structures within which men, apart from their initial gamete contributions, are 
wholly redundant. These are the lesbian and single mother families. The 
tension between these conservative and subversive valencies is resolved by 
selectively structuring NRT practice such that it is only carried out in forms 
that uphold and promote the traditional family. 
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Discourse on the NRTs thus contains a set of unspoken assumptions about 
women's role in 'the family'. Most of the dominant debate about human 
reproduction situates women within the private realm of the family, and the 
latter is presented as natural, unproblematic and unitary. This is most 
dramatically evident in the politics of a neofascist movement rapidly gaining 
momentum in the U.S.A. and elsewhere, the "New Right", a sector of which 
comprises antifeminist "pro-life" and "profamily" groups. 
observes that in a 
Eisenstein (1982) 
"fundamental sense the sexual politics of the New Right is implicitly 
antifeminist and racist: it desires to establish the model of the 
traditional white partriarchal family by dismantling the welfare state 
and by removing wage-earning married women from the labour force and 
returning them to the home." (p.78) 
Prevailing images of women prescribe for them certain ranges of acceptable 
behaviour. Within the pro-natalist context of most societies, motherhood is 
central to the conventional definition of woman, and departures from this are 
construed as deviant. (Albury, 1984; Osborne, 1984; Rowland, 1985) 
Preoccupation is with the 'biological' link between mother and child, while 
alternative forms of parenting (adoption) and caregiving are devalued (Crowe, 
1985). 
Notions of 'rights' and 'needs' are strategically invoked to reinforce the 
equation of womanhood with motherhood: the criminalization of abortion is 
vindicated as protecting the "rights of the embryo"; while technologically-
assisted conception is pleaded in terms of the "right to have children". 
Motherhood is thus upheld by being compelled and enabled by these notions 
respectively (Albury, 1984). But such claims to put women in possession of a 
'natural right' are refuted by the highly discriminatory selection of 'suitable' 
recipients. 
In support of such interventions, it is often argued that "women want it" 
(Crowe, 1985). Yet, it has been pointed out, an apparent 'choice' can be the 
result of subtle coercion and manipulation , a compulsion to choose the socially 
approved alternative (Hubbard, 1981; Arditti, 1985). 
"The 'right to choose' means very little when women are powerless 
Women make their own reproductive choices, but they do not make 
just as they please; they do not make them under conditions which 
themselves create, but under social conditions which they, as 
individuals, are powerless to change." 




Conceding that prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion has valid applications 
under circumscribed circumstances of genetic indication, Hubbard (1985) points 
out that its routinization creates difficulties for the majority of women, who 
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have no reason to suspect problems. A pregnant woman who refuses the test - or 
has it and decides not to abort in the knowledge that the fetus is disabled - is 
held responsible for the social, medical, and economic problems that result. 
Rothman (1985) argues that while amniocentesis does indeed offer new choices, 
such choices are made within an ever-narrowing social structure. The power to 
control the 'quality' of our children may cost the choice of not controlling 
that quality, as bearing and rearing a handicapped child could 
normatively unacceptable. 
become 
Although the risk of genetically induced disability is much less than that 
of acquiring a handicap later in life, the availability of amniocentesis and 
selective abortion creates the illusion that support services for the 
handicapped will become unnecessary. For example, as soon as prenatal diagnosis 
of Huntington's disease became possible, funding began to disappear for 
researching its cure (Hubbard, 1985). Society could renege on its recent 
commitment to disability rights (Kenen, 1981). (See Finger, 1984, for a 
discussion of the problematic interface between the disability rights and 
reproductive rights movements.) 
While traditionally abortion has centered around the question of whether or 
not to bear a child - any child, prenatal diagnosis introduces the question of 
what kind of child we are prepared to bear. Women can now choose not to give 
birth to a particular fetus. This generates a contradiction in definitions and 
demands, especially since amniocentesis can only be performed in the second 
trimester of pregnancy. 
"It asks women to accept their pregnancies and their babies, to take 
care of the babies within them, and yet to be willing to abort them 
(women) want to have amniocentesis to identify and to be able to 
abort a damaged fetus, but are afraid of the procedure's possible harm 
to their baby. (Rothman, 1985, p.190, original emphasis) 
Oakley (1984) has observed that while in the 1920's and 1930's the high 
incidence of maternal death in childbirth necessitated medicine's attending to 
the mother, by the 1950's such risks were minimized, and consequently mothers 
gradually became medically reconstructed as the containers of fetuses. Fetuses 
have gained "patient" status. Despite the physical unity of mother and fetus, 
these are treated as two distinctly different patients (Harrison, 1982). In a 
current legal trend in the U.S.A. women are identified as the 'prime fetal 
hazard' and legally penalized and restricted in the name of "fetal rights". 
Gallagher (1984) has documented cases in the U.S.A. where hospitals have 
obtained court orders forcing women to undergo caesarian sections in the 
supposed interests of their "fetal patients". In 1981, after a welfare agency 











the last two months of her pregnancy by a juvenile court which "took 
jurisdiction" of her pregnancy. Similarly, women of childbearing age are being 
barred from certain high-paying, traditionally male-occupied jobs under its 
"fetal vulnerability" policy, while there has been no attempt to exclude fertile 
women from lower-paying, traditionally women-occupied jobs in which the presence 
of reproductive hazards is well established (Ibid.). 
An effect of the NRTs is the fragmentation of motherhood: women can be 
assigned discrete, partial mothering roles - egg-donating "genetic" mother, 
'surrogate' "physiological" mother, or "social" mother. 
As Murphy has put it: 
"By dividing women into 'two classes' - layers and hatchers, our 
productive functions are further used to enforce reproduction as our 
essential being. Two reproductive classes of women can degrade women 
as 'parts' of 'reproductive bodies' and diminish our chances of 
obtaining reproductive rights for all women." (Murphy, 1984, p.73) 
Sex-selection and eugenics 
Although amniocentesis was initially developed in order to detect genetic 
defects, it is now commonly employed solely to determine the sex of a fetus 
facilitating "sex-selection" by abortion if the fetus is not the gender of the 
parents' choice. Similarly, "sex preselection" techniques have been developed 
that intervene before conception, either by means of artificial separation of 
androgenic and gynogenic sperm and subsequent fertilization by artificial 
insemination, or by timing the occurrence of intercourse and making use of 
functional differences between the two sperm types (Nentwig, 1981; Hoskins & 
Holmes, 1984) . 
Unlike sex-selection, sex-preselection does not involve the destruction of 
a fetus, and might thus seem more defensible (Powledge, 1981). But such 
reasoning begs the "pro-life" versus "pro-choice" polemic and to my mind misses 
the real issue - that both sex-selection and preselection facilitate evaluating 
human beings fundamentally in terms of their sex. There is an overwhelming 
preference for male offspring within patriarchal societies. In the few cultures 
whose daughters are preferred, this is due to their economic utility (Rowland, 
1984). In China, one-child families are encouraged and abortion is freely 
available to this end. An article in the Chinese Medical Journal reports that 
of 100 sex predictions made at one particular hospital, 30 resulted in planned 
abortions, a full 29 of which were of girls. (Cited in Nentwig, 1981, p.185.) 
On such evidence it does not seem overreactive to refer to such techniques 
as "femicide" (Hoskins & Holmes, 1984) and the "previctimization" of women 













women (McCormack, 1985). Steinbacher (1981) has pointed out that the preference 
for first-born sons, taken in conjunction with evidence that first-born children 
generally are advantaged in terms of intelligence, self-esteem, independence and 
achievement, potentiates a biological reinforcement of the traditional sex-role 
stereotype. Further, since poor women have restricted access to abortion, the 
number of first-born males would rise among the privileged and remain relatively 
unchanged amongst lower socioeconomic classes. Increasingly, women would be 
locked into poverty while men predominated in positions of power. 
The specialist-technicist mystification of amniocentesis and genetics for 
the lay person entails dependency on physicians and scientists' decisions about 
which disabilities are to be 'targeted'. Categorization of genes as 'good' or 
'bad' are political as well as medical decisions, and amount to judgements about 
'who should and who shouldn't inhabit the world' (Hubbard, 1985). 
There are signs of eugenic ideology in the practices surrounding artificial 
insemination by donor. Donors in the AID programs are typically medical 
students or graduate students, and while this may in part be due to practical 
convenience in recruitment, perhaps this practice also allows its agents to rest 
assured that their donors are 'superior specimens'. Far more explicitly, a 
"Repository for Germinal Choice" was founded in 1976 to collect the sperm of 
Nobel Prize winners, for those who will be satisfied with only 'the best' 
(Ardi tti, 1985) . 
Egg donation, in practice since 1983, similarly allows for differentiating 
'good' eggs from 'bad' ones. Current Israeli legislation provides a point in 
case: In 1986 the Ministry of Health published draft regulations to the effect 
that implantation of a fertilized ovum may be performed in a woman only if the 
ovum is her own or if it was retrieved from a "woman of the same People [i.e. 
ethnic-national origin] ... on grounds of the welfare [i.e. best interest] of 
the child" (quoted in Shapira, 1987, p.14, original parentheses). Earlier, the 
Supreme Helsinki Committee, an advisory body to the Ministry of Health, had 
initially advised permitting human egg donations from unmarried women only, 
because of the Jewish religious law of bastardy which attaches the stigma of 
bastardy to a child born to a married woman and not fathered by her Jewish 
husband. Later, however, the Committee authorized the acceptance of an ovum 
donation from a married woman, in exceptional instances of identified, "within 
the family" egg donations (Ibid.). 
Overall, consumers of the expensive NRTs comprise an elite population, 
while it is well-documented that poor women, black women and women from minority 
groups suffer sterilization abuse (Clarke, 1981; Savage, 1982). 





















In this section, I have developed a selective feminist critique of the 
NRTs, pointing to some of the ways in which these practices enact and reinforce 
the more general discriminatory social relations within which they take place. 
From a socialist feminist viewpoint, attention has been on the intersection of 
the NRTs with both partriarchy and capitalism. It has been shown how NRT 
practice is moulded into a particular form that preserves the traditional 
nuclear family and suppresses alternatives; and equally that capitalism has 
significantly captured and exploited this "new mercantile frontier" (Finkelstein 
& Clough, 1983), in orchestration with an arguably inadvertent but nonetheless 
operative class eugenics. While emphasis has been on how the NRTs militate 
against the biopsychosocial well-being of women, the suffering is also 
acknowledged of those involuntarily childless men whose life-worlds are 
compromised by these practices. 
Against the backdrop of issues raised here attention is turned, in Part II, 





















PART II : PSYCHOSOCIAL DISCOURSE IN CONTEXT 
METHODOLOGY 
The concerns of this study might seem only loosely related to the discipline of 
psychology as it is commonly conceptualized. It takes its place, however, 
within a contemporary "social constructionist movement" in modern psychology, 
which critically reconsiders the foundations of psychological explanation by 
placing knowledge within the process of social interchange (Henriques et al., 
1984; Gergen, 1986). 
"The explanatory locus of human action shifts from the interior region 
of the mind to the processes and structure of human interaction. The 
question 'why' is answered not with a psychological state or process, 
but with a consideration of persons in relationship" (Gergen, 1986, p. 
271 ) • 
Social constructionist psychological analyses have covered a wide range of 
subjects, including gender, aggression, mind, causality, person, self, child, 
motivation, emotion and morality; and the aims of social constructionism 
affiliate psychology with a host of interpretive disciplines sociology, 
anthropology, ethnomethodology, history, dramaturgical analysis and literary 
theory ( Ibid. ) . In that it is explicitly political, the constructionist 
framework is central to the search for a "feminist science" based on principles 
alternative to those of traditional empiricism, which has served patriarchy 
(e.g. Witt, et al., 1989; Harding, 1989; Halpin, 1989). Constructionism rejects 
traditional empiricist claims to objective foundations for knowledge through 
sense data, at the same time acknowledging its own failure to supply any 
alternative truth criteria, and hence recognizing its vulnerability to problems 
of relativism (Gergen, 1986). 
Part II involves the application of critical discourse analysis (as 
outlined in the Introduction) at a specific, situational level. Rather than 
seeking to test hypotheses and make generalizations in the empiricist mode, 
discourse analysis has as its goal hermeneutic understanding. It aims to 
achieve an overall interpretation of cumulative meaning, and validity is 
achieved by way of coherence (Levett, 1989). Subjectivity and selectivity of 
interpretation are acknowledged as paradigmatic. In this sense, the relevance 
of moral criteria for research are reasserted (Gergen, 1986). Analysis of 
discourse commonly examines texts, written or spoken, to discern recurring 
themes and make sense of these within a matrix of practices. Clearly, numerous 
different analyses of a single text are possible just as 'the context' may be 
































study was to an extent informed by the wider discursive topography traced in 
Part I. 
Data was gathered in the Infertility Clinic and the Andrology laboratory of 
Groote Schuur provincial hospital, with the aim of understanding the discursive 
parameters of how applicants for NRT are managed in this context. A first stage 
involved orientation to the system, by means of 
(i) attending initial intake interviews conducted by a nursing sister 
(ii) attending assessment interviews of applicants by a social worker 
(iii) attending weekly meetings in the Andrology lab at which patients were 
discussed 
(iv) informal discussions with clinic and lab staff. 
Notes were taken informally in each of these settings. 
understanding of these practices was gained, 
Once an ecological 
(v) a semi-structured interview with the social worker was audiotape-recorded. 
This was selectively transcribed for analysis, and is not appendixed. 
(vi) A 'fictitious case' was constructed and presented to the doctor and 
social worker (see Appendix III). The individual details of the case 
history were closely matched to details of cases actually observed. 
Deliberately, however, the case was unrealistically condensed, with far 
more 'problem areas' than are typically encountered in one history. 
These 'problems' were also purposefully ambiguous in order to elicit 
assumptions that might otherwise not have surfaced. This interview was 
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Referred to the hospital by general practitioners, privately practising 
gynaecologists and other health agencies, applicants for infertility treatment 
encounter a complex system, assessing them on a host of parameters to inform a 
judgement as to their fitness for parenthood. On this basis, reproductive 
technology is either permitted or withheld, and its guardians either combat or 
collude with applicants' involuntary childlessness. 
There exist a network of possible routes along which applicants may be conducted 
in sorting the eligible from the ineligible, as schematized in Figure 1. 
After an initial physical assessment at the Gynaecology Clinic, infertile 
patients are referred to the Infertility Clinic where they undergo an initial 
assessment of their "social background" by a nursing sister. Due to the heavy 
case-load, each assessment interview is limited to around 10 minutes. This 
constitutes a 'coarse' selection stage, the main aim of which is to rule out or 
pass applicants on any of three unambiguous criteria: 
(i) Only couples legally married for at least one year and producing a 
marriage certificate are accepted. 
(ii) They must have less than two children, unless one of the partners has not 
experienced biological parenthood. 
(iii) The woman must be under 40 years, though some latitude is permitted. 
If each of these criteria is fulfilled, the nursing sister superficially scans 
their financial status, housing circumstances, marital relationship and 
substance use/abuse. (See Appendix I for Sister's interview format.) 
In the absence of any apparent or suspected anomalies on the applicants' 
psychosocial profile, they are cleared for infertility treatment. However, if 
problems are perceived the couple is booked an appointment (several months 
thence) with the Medical Social Worker in Gynaecology, who conducts an hour-long 
investigation into their psychosocial status. With African applicants (usually 
Xhosa-speaking) who are not fluent in English/Afrikaans, the Social Worker works 
through an interpreter, a cumbersome procedure that potentiates miscommunication 
and militates against rapport (Anderson, 1976). A case was observed where, at 
the end of an hour-long assessment, as the Social Worker explained to a confused 
and dismayed couple that they could not be helped because they did not fit the 
criteria, it emerged that the woman was in fact already pregnant. They had kept 




same case is presented (first) under 'dealing with 
page 31.) The Social Worker's assessment entails a much 






'qualitative' evaluation. (See Appendix II for Social Worker's interview 
format.) Least ambiguous criteria applied by the Social Worker are in the 
following two areas: 
(i) Employment and finances : the couple are only accepted for treatment if 
the husband is formally employed. This is rationalized in terms of his 
being the sole breadwinner during his wife's pregnancy and postparturium, 
and financial resources flowing from informal-sector enterprise and the 
wife's earnings are not considered in the equation. Although no minimum-
earnings figure is formally applied, the Social Worker is reluctant to 
consider anything below R200.00 per month. Of greater perceived 
importance is how finances are managed: detailed questions are addressed 
to breakdown of expenses, debts, savings, and insurance 
'planning'. 
in short, 
(ii) Housing circumstances : a room of their own and cooking facilities not in 
that room are requisites. These are reasoned in terms of overcrowding 
being noxious to the future child; the need for privacy, especially under 
the stress of the infertility treatment regimen; and the hygienic 
problems and fire-hazards of cooking and baby-minding in the same room. 
Yet the Social Worker is further required to appraise what she terms "the 
quality of the people", and it is here that her assessment procedure is least 
standardized and most vulnerable to ambiguity, subjectivity and the influences 
of personal bias. 
Appraisals cluster around: 
(iii) marital relationship, and 
(iv) "personality", including: 
absence of psychopathology and drug-abuse 
adequate and appropriate motivation 
compliance 
desirable character-traits 
The Social Worker's assessment may lead her to instruct applicants to alter the 
structure of their lives in order to qualify, such as improve living quarters, 
or legally marry; she may send them away with "something to work on", a 
qualitative aspect of their marriage, for instance. Often these injunctions are 
accompanies by referral to outside organizations, commonly marital counselling 
and drug-rehabilitation centres and employment agencies. Applicants who fail on 
this first assessment are either given another appointment some months later for 
re-evaluation, or more vaguely told that they can always re-petition for 
treatment at any future point. In this way the Social Worker never formally and 
irreversibly rejects prospectors. Yet it was observed that most of her 
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appointments (either first or subsequent), were defaulted, suggesting that the 
actual effect of this protracted procedure is that many applicants, realizing 
the odds against them, simply give up. 
The Social Worker presents both those cases she has deferred and those whom 
she has positively approved at a weekly meeting in the Andrology Department, 
attended by laboratory technicians, nursing staff and doctors. At the time of 
writing, a clinical psychologist became attached to the team for the first time. 
Also at this meeting, the nursing sister presents those cases that she deems 
problematic yet hasn't referred to the Social Worker - such as when applicants 
are suspected of misinformation; have repeatedly failed to keep appointments 
(after defaulting three times, they are discharged); are on disability grants; 
are on particular medications incompatible with treatment; or are requesting 
reversal of tubal ligation (untying of fallopian tubes). Such cases may either 
be discharged, accepted for treatment, or re-routed to the social worker. 
Applicants to whom 'suitability' has been ascribed then embark on a sequence of 
medical work-up and treatment interventions not detailed here. 
Having outlined this elaborate filtering apparatus as it is visible and as 
it is formally presented by its exponents, it remains to comment on a feature 
that is easily overlooked if not concealed - what may be termed backdoor 
referrals. These are cases that, due to a liaison between an outside referral 
source and the doctor heading the Andrology team, circumvent all formal hospital 
assessments and pass directly on to treatment. An explanation offered by the 
nursing sister was that in such instances medical work-up has already been 
completed in private practice, making further physical investigations at the 
Gynae and Infertility Clinics unnecessary. This fails to explain why such 
patients are exempted from the psychosocial assessment routinely undergone by 
all other applicants. Private gynaecologists do not commonly subject their 
patients to formal psychosocial evaluation. As the head of the Andrology team 
put it: "In private everybody gets treated." It cannot be the case, then, that 
backdoor patients have been comparably psychosocially assessed elsewhere, and 
the only remaining explanation for their fuss-free acceptance must be that their 
suitability for parenthood is deemed "obvious". Since treatment in private 
practice is prohibitively expensive, backdoor patients referred from private are 
likely to be socio-economically advantaged over routine applicants. Suggested 
in this management practice is that socio-economically privileged patients, by 
virtue of their social status and power, are in turn granted privileged access 
to reproductive technology - sparing them the discomfort and inconvenience of 
psychosocial scrutiny. Their suitability is assumed. 
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The Operational Philosophy 
Transcendent discursive statements and abstract ideologies must be concretized 
if they are to provide practical parameters for decision-making and action in 
particular contexts, giving rise to formulations that Smith (1977) has termed 
"operational philosophies": 
Like ideologies operational philosophies are coherent sets of ideas. 
They are consistent with the respective ideologies which they 
interpret at the situational level. An operational philosophy can 
therefore always be justified by referring to the ideological position 
which is itself seen as requiring no further justification (quoted in 
Parton, 1985, p.14). 
Operational philosophies are thus usefully vivid substantiations of ideology, 
into which they may be sublimated under careful scrutiny. 
philosophy employed in the setting under study may 




( i) a central core made up of operationalizations that are relatively 
unambiguous. These are the criteria and injunctions constituting the 
'official' version, as explained by its exponents. 
(ii) a peripheral 'umbrated' region : comprising those considerations brought 
to bear on practice that are less clearly formulated. Although 
'unconscious' in the sense of not being officially articulated, these are 
no less influential. 
Figure 2 arranges the principle operational components along a continuum from 










Figure 2 Re1ative C1arity of Operationa1izations 
* married couples only 
* less than 2 children, unless one partner is not 
yet a biological parent 
* woman under 40 years (some flexibility) 
* absence of certain physical disorders and 
medications incompatible with treatment/pregnancy 
* patients on disability grants rejected 
* suitable housing 
* financial stability 
* good marital relationship 
* stable and suitable personality 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Thusfar the principal features of this fairly complex decision-making apparatus 
have been detailed. The next section considers some of the agentic manoeuvers 
employed by gatekeepers and applicants as the model is played out between them. 
Strategies at the Gatekeeper-Applicant Interface 
Discourse analysis is a diverse field. Kuipers (1989) has identified three 
principle approaches to the study of medical discourse as referential, (post) 
structural, and interactional. The first approach treats language as a 
practical tool of reference, and thus does not address issues of power and 
social control. The second has as its focus the interrelation between language, 
power and differential social relations, but at a level transcendent of day-to 










rigorously describe discourse as it is interactively constructed in specific 
contexts. 
Kuipers points to the dilemma that while the (post) structural approach is 
weakened by its vagueness as a transcendent construction, equally, interactional 
micro-analyses are bound by their situation-specificity. He proposes 
synthesis by viewing these two perspectives as stages in 
institutionalization of discourse, the process of "entextualization": 
This term describes the ideological, linguistic, and interactional 
processes by which a given piece of discourse comes to be gradually 
detached (de-centered) from its immediate conversational and 
contextual surround, thus removed from the hazards of interruption, 
face-threatening negotiations, and challenges to its very existence 
... [and transformed into] the decontextualized "texts" of biomedical 
knowledge. (Kuipers, 1989, p.101) 
a 
the 
Information and meanings initiated in the clinical encounter embark on a 
"semiotic career", systematically coded and receded at successive institutional 
levels in obedience to specific bureaucratic constraints. (Ibid.) 
It will not be attempted here to systematically trace the de-centering of 
discourse within the present milieu. A more focused aim of the following 
section will be to elucidate some of the interactional strategies that go into 
shaping the interface between applicants and gatekeepers. Within the context 
under study reproductive technology is a scarce and valued commodity, eagerly 
sought by the prospective patients and closely guarded by its medical keepers. 
At stake in the face-to-face negotiations between guardians and applicants is no 
less than the latter's legitimacy for and chance of parenthood, and this 
loadedness invites tactical behaviour from both sides. 
"Something fishy there" Silence and misinformation 
The gatekeepers are well aware that applicants often know the acceptance 
criteria in advance and strategically and selectively furnish false information 
in order to receive treatment. Consequently, applicants' accounts of their 
psychosocial profile are not taken at face value, and interviewers are sensitive 
to any inconsistencies - within a single interview, across interviews (often 
patients deliver contradictory accounts to the nursing sister and social 
worker), or between verbal and (perceived) nonverbal behaviour. Thus the 






Case example: The nursing sister is interviewing a woman who 
has been accepted for treatment and upon whom several tests 
have been completed, but whose husband failed to attend his 
appointment for a sperm test. Asked why her husband did not 
accompany her to the present appointment as requested, the 
woman at first explains "he's away on work", but when told 
that treatment cannot proceed until the test is completed, 
she shifts to "he doesn't like the hospital." 
In response the nursing sister comments: "die vrou loop haar 
skoene stukkend en die man sit lekker by die huis" (while the 
wife runs around the husband relaxes at home). Another 
appointment date is given, and after the interview she 
comments that since that will be his third appointment it is 
"taken with a pinch of salt". (Patients are usually 
discharged after defaulting three times.) 
Case example: After an assessment interview, the social 
worker comments on the couple's marital relationship: 
"They say they're happily married, but you can see by the way 
they're communicating while they're sitting there that 
they're telling a lie about their marriage ... I don't know 
how to explain it ... " 
And of another case: "I had an idea that he was beating her 
and carrying on. But they did not confirm this in the 
interview and I still referred them (for marital counselling) 
because I just had the feeling it was there." 
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Often applicants are reticent in talking to the interviewer about their lives, 
and such silences may not necessarily be strategic, but also possibly due to 
~--
shyness, suspiciousness, limited social skills, the problems of working through 
an interpreter, or simply ignorance about what constitutes 'relevant 
information' . Discussing the difficulty of obtaining information on 'family 
history', the social worker comments: 
"I want to know more ... but they don't give me what I want 
to get it from them ... Party keer moet ek dit uittrek 
(sometimes I have to pull it out of them)." 
"It's like an exam" Dealing with confrontation 
- I've got 
uit hulle 
Infrequently, applicants openly protest when they are denied access to 
treatment. The following two case examples illustrate how, when challenged 










rules are applied, but reiterates that they are there to be obeyed, thus 
shifting responsibility onto the system and minimalizing her agency in the 
process, (in a manner reminiscent of a prisoner of war divulging only name, 
number and rank in accordance with the Geneva Convention). 
Case example: A young couple are both unemployed and living 
with and being supported financially by the wife's brother. 
Social worker (through Xhosa interpreter): "We can't help 
people who don't have employment ... We can't help people to 
have babies if others have to look after them ... the house 
is O.K., everything is O.K .... but there's this problem 
I can't go to the team because they'll just say no 
INTERPRETER: "He says he has money in the bank." 
S.W. : "He must have secure employment." (To the observer: 
"Money is in the bank, but others must pay for him?!") 
INTERPRETER: "He says: but he helped his brother-in-law when 
he was unemployed." 
S.W.: "We have certain rules ... all those criteria the team 
has decided upon must be met ... and a very important 
one is employment ... I didn't make the rules, the 
team did ... it's like passing exams at school ... 
We'd like to help you." 
Case example: A woman earns over R300.00 per month and her 
husband is not formally employed but earns some money fixing 
household appliances at home, and has been promised employ-
ment within the next month. The social worker explains the 
employment criterion and asks that he bring her the details 
of his job once this is underway. Later in the interview the 
husband interjects: 
"I'm worried if the doctors don't give us a baby. We want a 
baby like everyone else." 
S.W. "It's like an exam. We want to help you, but you must 
fit the criteria." 
H "On the other hand, I am doing work so I am 
getting money." 
S.W. "I can't take something hanging in the air to the 
meeting." 
H "I understand." 
While prospective patients may elect to be silent, deliberately mislead, or 
openly challenge their arbiters in seeking access to reproductive technology, 
the gatekeepers to this commodity utilize a number of stratagems aimed at taking 







"Shields and retreats" Criteria as pretexts 
Sometimes the selectors have misgivings about a particular applicant for reasons 
they choose to conceal. Usually in such cases other, more formalized, criteria 
are invoked as a basis for exclusion, and it is these with which the gatekeeper 
may unassailably say no while preserving the secrecy of more personal sentiments. 
Doctor: "Occasionally we had problems where we had lesbian couples 
coming in. And that was our easy way out in all of that. We'd say: 
'Look, you're not married, we cannot treat you.' Simple. So it was a 
kind of a shield to push in front of you though its actually not the 
reason why you don't want to treat them. It's just because yourself 
you feel a bit uncomfortable or threatened by it ... " 
Case example:. A woman sterilized eight years ago has applied 
for reversal of tubal ligation. She claims to be aged 40, 
though her date of birth indicates that she is 45, and her 
husband works part-time. They had two children, one of whom 
was shot dead by police. The nursing sister presents the 
case to the team querying their financial eligibility. The 
doctor comments: "We are even reluctant at age 40 to treat 
... we can always retreat to that unless somebody's keen." 
"Give them a chance" Token deferments 
Although the social worker frequently does not accept applicants, she nonethe-
less manages to avoid the discomfort of actually rejecting them. The unaccepted 
are treated as having the power to reshape their social worlds into an improved 
form, an approach consistent with the liberal individualist ideology, 'life is 
entirely what you make it', and they are given the overt message that they are 
welcome to return should they manage, through application and determination, to 
more closely fit the received psychosocial template. 
Social Worker: "I won't say 'no, never' - I would say 'just go and 
try and see if you can sort this out', by referring them ... When I'm 
not sure, I let them come back to me in three months' time - work on 
something and then come back ... If it's really a problem that I think 
can't be sorted out, I will in any case give them the benefit of the 
doubt ... give them a chance." 
Just as the decision-making apparatus is placed under stress in the face-to-face 
realities of gatekeeper-applicant interactions, it also is tested against the 
personal beliefs and ambivalences of those who implement it. This forms the 








Accommodating the Model 
A single text may be multivocal, simultaneously harbouring anomalous 
contradictory discourses. Commonly, dominant discourses are accompanied 





what Foucault has named the "underside" or "counterstroke" of relations of power 
(1977, in Gordon 1980; Levett, 1989). In this way, discursive heterogeneity 
potentiates social change (Henriques et al., 1984). 
The particular form and dynamics of the decision-making system under study 
flow from a dialectical process between gatekeepers' individual, personal 
beliefs and agendas on the one hand, and on the other, the imperatives of the 
bureaucratic 
constraint. 
and political structure to which these people are obedient by 
Personal values and structural injunctions are not always 
isomorphic, and this section is aimed at illustrating some of the frictions at 
their interface. 
Two contradictory tendencies are discernible within the gatekeepers' talk 
about their model, namely vindication, and expression of discomfort. 
"There was just no control" Gatekeepers' vindications 
The current selection procedure was initiated approximately two years ago, and 
its principal rationalizations may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Due to finite resources and heavy demand, it is not possible to treat 
everyone, and thus selection is unavoidable. 
(2) Preference should be given to "those who need it most". 
(3) Careful selection ensures greater effectiveness and hence improved account-
ability to critics. 
Doctor: "(It) has saved us a helluva lot of trouble, and a helluva 
lot of waste of investigation ... especially where the whole thing 
costs a lot of money and you had to be responsible to other depart-
ments who accused you of wasting money on a luxury like IVF. So you 
must be able to defend yourself and say 'look, I've got very, very 
strict selection criteria, and these are the only types of patients 
I'm treating.'" (The fact that more advanced treatments are financed 
by the patients themselves is also used to rebut critics.) 
(4) Some people should not be parents. 
Doctor: "We came to find that actually lots of our patients 
socially completely unacceptable ... you know, really they came 
the darkest backgrounds you could imagine ... I mean there was 
no control" ..... 
















Reason (1) simply begs the question of what form that selection should take. 
Principle (2)'s answer to this is very circumscribed- preference should be 
given to those with no children or the least children, and those who have not 
yet experienced biological parenthood. (It is striking that the perceived 
importance of biological parenthood overrules the number of children whom that 
person parents socially, as well as any concerns about population growth. 
Thus,if a partner is not a biological parent, they may have well in excess of 
two children in the family and, as long as they can financially 'afford' another 
child, be accepted for treatment.) Reason (1) does not address the wide range 
of other psychosocial variables that are weighed in the assessment. 
Rationalization (3) is of a pragmatic-strategic nature: selecting compliant 
and socially attractive patients saves "trouble" and "waste", ensuring greater 
cost-effectiveness and presenting a cleaner image to those who have the 
bureaucratic power to sanction or restrict the technology. However, in the 
overall cost-effectiveness balance, patient non-compliance surely contributes 
minimally to the very low success rate of IVF. And again the host of other 
variables brought under scrutiny are not explained. Without diminishing the 
practical-logistical constraints of limited resources and accountability, it is 
evident that these factors are somewhat arbitrary contingencies compared with 
the fundamental fourth proposition, that some people should not be patients. 
This fourth belief not only exerts itself independently of specific bureaucratic 
contexts, but also extends beyond the simple counting of children, into a 
valuative domain. 
The discursive roots of these judgements will be elucidated after 
examining, in the following section, some of the subversive elements 
gatekeepers' talk about their practices. 
"Skating on thin ice" Gatekeepers' discomfort 
first 
within 
When gatekeepers expressed their misgivings, this tended to evidence the 
intrusion into their discourse of "common sense", or what has been termed "folk 
knowledge" (e.g. Locke, 1982). 
Doctor: "(Infertility) could happen to all of us! ... If there were 
nothing wrong with them (the applicants), nobody would ask them 
they would take the decision anyway ... In principle it should be the 
patient themselves who decide on whether they have a child or not 
I mean, who am I to decide ... ? ... Only if she's got a medical 
disease is it my duty to advise her 'hey, it's no good for you to fall 
pregnant'. But on grounds that she's got two children to tell her 
'hey, look you mustn't have another child' ... it's actually not my 















Each of the gatekeepers expressed in some way an experience of alienation from 
their performed role. Thus the nursing sister described the system she deploys 
as being "like a sausage machine"; and the doctor speaks of being " pushed 
into that situation, it's not that I want to be there." Yet also evident are 
attempts to reconcile these conflicts, to achieve coherence of belief and 
action. 
Doctor: "We're not telling them they mustn't fall pregnant. Nobody 
says that. we will not tell them 'look, you mustn't have a child' ... 
we say 'look we've got so much at our disposal, we cannot help every-
body, and we must select somehow.'" 
Are they really not telling applicants, implicitly and explicitly, that they 
should not have children? Only in cases where refusal is on grounds of the 
number of children they have, since this is purely statistical. All other 
criteria, (aside from those addressing physical contraindications to pregnancy), 
carry implicit value-judgements as to applicants' psychosocial fitness for 
parenthood. Hence all people rejected in terms of such criteria are being told, 
albeit implicitly, that they should not become parents, with or without the 
assistance of reproductive technology - at least not in their current psycho-
social condition. It is quite likely that refused applicants detect this 
implicit message, and perhaps this partly explains why so many applicants fail 
to keep their appointments with the social worker. If so, it is possible that 
such a refusal would be received as a rejection, and most likely compound 
feelings of failure and low self-esteem probably already present as a result of 
the infertility. There is conspicuously absent from the selection apparatus any 
procedure for 'picking up the casualties'. 
Social Worker: "I feel I'm skating on thin ice/ ... I feel unsafe 
because I've got to make a decision on the quality of the people 
and I don't know if I'm right or wrong, or if I'm too strict or too 
lenient. I've got to use my knowledge of people or my sixth sense or 
whatever, but I've got to use something to come to that conclusion 
I know something of their (i.e. African and "Coloured") culture, but I 
don't know everything. I'll accept or condemn them in my frame of 
reference, and then I've got to tell myself, 'you can't look at it 
that way, you've got to think about what they see as right and wrong' 
I've got to work on myself because of my very strict upbringing. 
I'm not sure sometimes whether I'm really giving them the benefit of 
the doubt or taking something away from them/ .... I try to stay very 
objective/.... I think it's better to be too strict than too 
lenient." 
Aware of the dangers of enthnocentricism, the social worker is nonetheless 
caught in a contradictory position: she tries to stay "very objective", yet is 













bias but, as she admits, has limited understanding of "their culture". Folk 
beliefs regarding 'ethnic differences' abound in gatekeepers' discourse. 
Unfortunately space constraints do not enable any detailing of these. 
Ultimately, as the following quote illustrates, the social worker's impression 
overrules applicants' accounts of their own psychosocial world. 
Social Worker: "What I sometimes think is not such a good marriage 
they accept as a very good marriage. It's different from person to 
person, so I look at the marriage (in terms of) what they are 
expecting from it - if they are satisfied, I accept it. That's why 
I'm not arguing whether they're happily married, unless I can see in 
the way they're interacting that it's not so good." 
Marginalization 
The social worker's role is structurally marginalized in that she is a 
consultant working in the department of another speciality. Yet quite 
paradoxically, she is given considerable power in her capacity as psychosocial 
'specialist'. 
"The child must have a chance": The ideology of disqualification 
As we have seen, once the issues of limited resources and bureaucratic-
logistical constraints, together with purely physical contraindications to 
pregnancy, and the essentially statistical cut-off criterion of two children are 
all cleared to one side, what remains is the fundamental impetus of the system: 
the discursive statement, some people do not qualify to be parents. 
This section explores how this statement and its related practices are 
ideologically upheld by a pervasive preoccupation - the well-being of the 
technologically potentiated child. 
The rationale of excluding people from treatment in the 'best interests of 
the child' was seldom spontaneously disclosed in gatekeepers' talk, as if it 
were somehow self-evident. Eliciting it often required 'naive' questioning of 
flat imperatives such as "they must ... ", or "he's got to II 
Doctor: "I try to put a motive in front of all of what we are 
thinking about when we make a decision about whether to treat a couple 
or not: Is the environment conducive to child education?" 
Social Worker: "They must have . . . quality of life . . . The child 
must have a chance if he's got the ability." 
The pervasiveness of this consideration is evident across both clearly 
operation-alized criteria and ambiguous considerations: 
re: Financial Security 
Social worker: "He's got to have a permanent job/ ... he's got to have 
a stable income/... because they've got to make some kind of 
provisions for that child's future." 
Doctor: "You cannot feed a family on that (amount)" 
re: Adequate Housing 
Social worker: "They've got to have proper housing. We can't let a 
baby grow up in a zinc hok ... although there are some that are fairly 
smart inside- they can make it quite nice/ .... Overcrowded places are 
not safe for a small baby- all the germs and things like that." 
re: Education 
Social Worker: "People who are trying to get a better education will 
try to give their children a better education - will go out of their 
way to give their children what is important to a child. Somebody 
with a Std. II or III wouldn't really back their child up or put in a 
special effort to make it possible for that child to really better 
himself." 
re: Personality 
Social Worker: "Their values must be right honesty with the 
interviewer mean they will be honest with their children." 
re: Marital Harmony 
Social Worker: "It's to give the child security. If 
don't have a good relationship, there won't be lots 
security or anything in the house for the child." 
the parents 
of love or 
Doctor: "I think a child should get a world picture which contains 
mother and father, and these two are supposed to stay together." 
Social Worker (discussing a case): "I'm looking at their quality as 
future parents ... I think a marriage like this and a guy like him 
spells security for the child." 
"Good Human Material" 
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We have discerned within the gatekeepers' operational philosophy that some of 
the considerations shaping their practices are poorly formulated, unofficial, 
and relatively unconscious, but nonetheless dynamically influential. 
These umbrated criteria are most noticeable within the orbit of the Social 
Worker, to whom 'finer' psychosocial scrutiny is delegated. It is her task to 
assess "the quality of the people " and make recommendations as to whether or 
not applicants constitute "goeie mens materiaal" (good human material). 
Two considerations feature prominently in this appraisal, namely of 'marital 
relationship' and 'personality'; and this section seeks to trace the discursive 
features of the "good personality" specifically. 
Some of the evaluative summary statements made by the social worker at 
weekly meetings included: 
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* "A very well-balanced couple - I think they will be fine parents in the 
end." 
* "everything's fine" 
* "they seem O.K." 
* "very suitable" 
* "good quality parents, I think" 
At times her template becomes transparent in interaction with applicants as she 
directly expresses approval or becomes didactic in prescribing certain 
behaviours. Some exemplary comments include: 
* to a husband who does not save: "It's good to put a little bit away." 
* to a husband who has been in the same employment for the last seven years: 
"dis mooi, baie mooi" (good, very good). 
* 
* 
of a husband: "he's a lucky man he won't ever have a button off." 
to a husband: "jy't 'n baie op en wakker vrou" (your wife is very on the 
ball). 
The following passage comprises selected excerpts of the social workers' talk 
with respect to 'personality'. 
"She's not doing anything at home - she's just sitting, not doing 
housework or anything ... she expects others to do what should be 
done in the house ... it's her whole attitude at the moment she's 
definitely not very mature yet as a person/ .... I like them to have 
something that they're interested in while they're at home I've 
got such a lot of things that I'm interested in that I can't just sit. 
I must always be occupied. But I can't evaluate them on my standards 
though I always ask them about it, just to see/ .... An active person, 
with an active brain who thinks for themselves and plans has something 
they're interested in ... I mean I'll allow you to sit and read but 
not just sit - that first woman said she's just sitting doing nothing! 
And I mean, what kind of personality can she have - she's going to 
become duller and duller/ .... I like them to plan for their future, 
not to accept things as they are, but to do something about it. I'm 
looking at character a lot- decent, honest ... A lot of it is about 
working with people over a long time, getting used to certain things 
and spotting certain things which you know are negative/ .... (relying 
in interviews): Dit wys vir my hulle betroubaarheid en eerlikheid 
kwaliteit (It demonstrates that reliability and honorability 
quality)/.... She's a very "stabiele soort mens" (stable sort of 
person), she's been working at the same place for eight years 
already/ .... He's changing, he's getting more western in his approach 
to things ... to fit in here he's got to have that to survive. The 
real 'rou' (raw) persons coming here- they never survive ... And the 
fact that he wants to study and get somewhere - that's the western 
society influence too ... they're both intelligent enough to survive 
He's got a very strong personality this guy - he's actually a 
very, very interesting person ... I can see that he's going to be a 
man who will be there for his wife - he'll be there to solve problems 
should there be any ... he's obviously the one she's listening to/ .... 
I find that people who've got a strong religious background are - not 
always, but in some ways- 'meer stabiel' (more stable) than others. 
Dit gee ook sekuriteit aan die kind (it also gives the child 
security) when they're church-going people or something like that ... 
they've got very high values ... (though) you can have high values 
without being religious." 
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Thus, in addition to the requirements of absence of 'psychopathology' and 'drug-
abuse', adequate and appropriate motivation, and compliance, there exist a host 
of subtle, umbrated personality traits that are not formally or systematically 
applied, but aggregated a highly subjective fashion to inform a final conclusion 
as to whether applicants are of sufficient "quality" to be parents. 
The ideal traits evident in the social worker's talk form a model of 
someone decent, reliable, honest, honorable, preferably religious but at least 
of high values, stable, mature, educated and/or educationally ambitious, 
intelligent, westernized, an independent thinker, a planner and problem-solver, 
strong of character, interesting, a 'survivor', active and industrious. 
There is also evidence in these constructions of distinct sexual stereotypes, 
but limited space prevents further examination of these. 
"Par for the Course" . . Family Ideology 
Gatekeepers are legally prohibited from applying reproductive technology to 
anybody other than a married couple (see Introduction) and both the social 
worker and the doctor obey but distance themselves from this injunction. 
Social Worker: "I ask this for the sake of the criteria so that I can 
report back it's not that important to me it spells more 
security for the family, but not necessarily." 
Doctor: " ... this is not one of my criteria ... 10 years together and 
they don't get married for their personal reasons, but they're intent 
to stay together for the rest of their lives, they can be perfectly 
good parents -why should they not have a child? ... they've got a 
very good relationship, they've stayed together ... " 
Even though the doctor is implicitly referring to committed heterosexual 
relationships, this very same argument could support making reproductive 
technology available to lesbians who fit the above description. But he goes on: 
"Occasionally we had problems where we had lesbian couples coming in 
Is the environment conducive to child education? It's an 
extremely difficult question. (With) a gay couple even more difficult 
... To grow up in an environment like that- I don't know, I just feel 
a bit reluctant ... I don't want to be part of it. It's my 
personal thing./(re. single mothers): (If) there was a couple who 
were together and they went apart and now she or he is a single parent 
... now that's just par for the course ... But to start ab initio with 
something like that - I don't feel quite right. Maybe there I'm also 
a bit old-fashioned, but I think that a child should get a world 
picture which contains mother and father, and these two are supposed 
to stay together ... so I'm actually quite happy about marriage being 
in the law, though there are some patients I would say (for whom) it's 
not indicated ... " 
The discursive parameters of this particular medical milieu 
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have 
illustrated the extent to which medicine reaches beyond the biophysical and into 
the psychosocial. It is somewhat ironic that for medicine to apply itself to a 
human problem (infertility) that it has so adamantly insisted belongs under the 
wing of medical biotechnology, psychosocial discourse is so heavily relied upon. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this work I have not sought to argue that all of the new reproductive 
technologies are in every aspect inherently noxious to women. Though they 
are unified in certain important ways, there also exist quite substantial 
differences between these interventions. Suffice it to highlight the 
differences between IVF and AID with respect to technologization, physical 
risks to women, and financial cost. 
On the assumption that technology is inevitably shaped to the 
advantage of certain groups, focus has been on the social relations played 
out on the NRT stage, and how these transactions are ideologically 
mediated. Although in the cloak and make-up of modern biotechnology, the 
leading actors are easily recognized to be patriarchy and capitalism. And 
in obedience to these, western biomedecine has constructed and claimed 
ownership of infertility as "disease", serving as the institutional vehicle 
for the body politic (Brown & Adams, 1979; Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1988). 
I wish now briefly and selectively to make ideological sense of one 
discursive theme that pervaded gatekeepers' talk in Part II: 
preoccupation with the well-being of the potential child. Although 




at the same time threaten the dissolution of the traditional nuclear family 
structure. This ideological tension is evidenced in the equivocal and 
contradictory discourse on the deployment of the NRTs: witness the 'rights 
of adults to procreate', cited in vindication of the NRTs, running up 
against the 'rights of the (potential) child' to have 'suitable' parents, 
an argument invoked to justify withholding treatment. Similar equivocality 
is to be seen in the doctor's talk about selection: " ... in principal it 
should be the patient themselves who decide on their own whether they have 
a child or not", versus "Is the environment conducive to child education?" 
Silences and omissions within discourse are as significant as 
predominances (Levett, 1989; Kuipers, 1989), and 'rights of the child' 
discourse bears a reciprocal relationship to the 'rights of women'. Women 
are simply not accorded a substantive existence within the dominant 
discourse. If not altogether invisible, women are implicated only in a 
peripheral and subsidiary relationship, constructed in terms of 'the rights 
of the embryo' and its amplification 'the well-being of the child.' It is 
argued here in agreement with Spallone (1986), that child-centered 
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discourse on the NRTs serves a strategic function in policing women's 
sexuality and maintaining the moral superiority of the patriarchal family. 
It also further functions to vindicate a subtle and arguably inadvertent 
class-eugenics. To argue that it is in the interests of the child that the 
parents be financially secure, have a room of their own, be legally 
married, etc is to skew selection dramatically in favour of the socio-
economically privileged, as does the practice of backdoor referrals. The 
contextual realities of these procedures include an alternative African 
'lobola' system of formal marriage, rampant unemployment amongst the 
working class, and an acute housing crisis in Cape Town - an official state 
survey conducted in 1988 estimated an average of 3,2 people to a bed in the 
"single-sex" hostels of Langa, Nyanga, and Guguletu (in the Weekly Mail, 
1989). 
It is vitally important to extend feminist critique of the NRTs into 
strategic women-centered action. To these ends, a "Women's Emergency 
Conference on the New Reproduction Technologies" was held in July 1985 in 
Sweden by FINNRET (Feminist International Network on the New 
Technologies), now named FINNRAGE (Feminist International 
Reproductive 
Network of 
Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering) (Arditti, 1985). It 
seems unrealistic to call for a moratorium on all NRT as Mies (1985) does, 
though it is encouraging that the WHO is alive to feminist health issues 
(Koch & Morgall, 1987; Brody, 1988) and has critically declared IVF to be 
experimental and not (yet) therapeutic, recommending that finances more 
appropriately be directed into researching the initial aetiology of 
infertility. The need to carefully monitor the NRTs has been stressed 
(Arditti, Klein & Minden, 1984; Hanmer, 1984; Minden, 1985), and of 
particular importance, given the considerable momentum of this field, is to 
anticipate future research directions. It is vital that feminists remain 
as informed as possible and disseminate relevant information wherever 
possible (Corea, 1985, in Arditti, 1985), and it would seem especially 
valuable to forge links with women practitioners and scientists working 
within these technologies. Continued critical evaluation of the shape of 
feminist science - in terms of both theory building and actual scientific 
practice - is essential. The current polemic between feminist critics of 
"bad science" and feminist critics of "science as usual" is examined by 
Harding (1989), who proposes a dialectical relationship between these: 
" the tension between them is important to maintain as our feminisms 
attempt to remake the production of knowledge in conditions not of our own 
choosing" (p.271). Clarifying feminist agendas for science will have 
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important implications for women and "feminist men" working within the 
orbit of the NRTs. 
'Psychological' discourse on the NRTs has been implicitly obedient to 
dominant ideology a situation begging careful feminist and social 
constructionist research from within psychology. Clinical psychologists 
attached to NRT programmes need to be aware that although structurally 
marginalized within a medical hierarchy, they nonetheless wield tremendous 
power (as do social workers) -as 'psychosocial specialists'. This 
necessitates a critical, self-reflexive appreciation of the ways in which 
their practices might be complicitous with medical social control. Many 
writers have suggested a pradigmatic incommensurability between clinical 
psychology and biomedicine (Elfant, 1985; Miller, 1988). Additionally, it 
has been noted that although multidisciplinary "teamwork" is the popular 
management model in contemporary medicine, its espoused values of open 
communication and shared leadership are largely cosmetic, since in 
actuality "different professionals add their piece of the clinical puzzle 
but look to one members to put it together" (Shaw, 1986, p.63). Tension is 
thus to be expected in situations where clinical psychologists seek to 
bring 
this 
critical, women-centered values into their work with the NRTs, 




Three potential roles exist for psychology within the field of the 
NRTs , namely research, assessment, and counselling/psychotherapy. From 
the thesis of this study, psychological research has a pivotally 
constructive role to play provided that such work is not co-opted to sexist 
and classist agendas. This carries the implicit injunction that all 
psychological research into the NRTs should exhibit a self-reflexive 
appreciation of its ideological locus. 
It is the second of these spheres, assessment, where psychologists' 
involvement in the NRTs is the most problematic, since it is here that they 
(i) become directly implicated in social engineering by deciding who may 
and may not procreate, and (ii) affiliate themselves with and therefore 
implicitly support a biotechnology that carries considerable physical risks 
to its recipient women, has a less than one-in-ten chance of success, and 
is exorbitantly expensive (I focus here on IVF). A thorough discussion 
cannot be ventured here of the ethical implications of clinical 
psychological practice (Steere, 1984) in this assessment capacity. At the 
very least, however, clinical psychologists performing this role should be 
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aware of the ideological matrix within which they act, and seek to 
similarly conscientize their gatekeeper-colleagues. 
The third role, that of counsellor/therapist, represents a potential 
contribution for clinical psychology that is tangible, practical and at the 
same time relatively free of valuative underpinnings. Intervention in this 
capacity would seem most obviously indicated in the following ways: 
(i) Providing a supportive couselling facility for those applicants who 
are turned away. 
(ii) Assisting prospective recipients in resolving ambivalences about 
whether to enter into treatment, realistically discussing the 
chances of success and preparing them for the experiences commonly 
undergone on the programme. 
(iii) Supportive counselling during treatment. The stresses of IVF 
programmes are well-documented (e.g. Johnston, Shaw & Bird, 1987; 
Leiblum, Kenman & Lane, 1987) and acknowledged by practitioners. 
In conclusion, while this critique has focused searchingly and at 
times pointedly on practice within a particular medical setting, I wish to 
emphasize that criticisms are not raised to cast doubt on professional 
integrity. It must be realized that gatekeepers working within this 
context are powerfully influenced by socialization and the structural 
constraints of medical protocol and legislation. Frequently, despite our 
best intentions, things remain invisible to us until pointed out. It is 
hoped that this work offers a 'fresh perspective', some clarification of 
issues that are not easily unwrapped, and goes toward constructively 




Artificial Insemination by Husband/Donor (AIH/AID) 
Non-coital placement of sperm into the upper vagina or womb. Usually used to 
aid conception in cases of male-factor infertility, but also utilized non-
medically by gay women and single celibate women who wish to become mothers. 
(See Hanscombe & Forster, 1982.) 





in cases of female-factor infertility, but increasingly being 
situations of male-factor and also undiagnosed infertility 
IVF"), this technique was originally designed chiefly to bypass 
fallopian tubes. The procedure involves hyperstimulation of the 
ovaries in order to obtain the highest possible number of mature ova in one 
cycle; surgical removal by laparoscope or transvaginal aspiration of the ova for 
fertilization (usually but not always by the husband's sperm) in a cultured 
medium. Roughly two days after fertilization, several of the resulting embryos 
are transferred to the woman's uterine cavity through her vagina. The pregnancy 
rate might be improved by increasing the number of transferred embryos, but this 
incurs an increased risk not only of spontaneous abortion, but of multiple 
pregnancy. The remaining embryos can be deep frozen for later use. (Van Hall, 
1987, in Brody, 1987). 
Oocyte (egg) - donation 
Analogous to AID in that it involves the donation of a gamete, this is an IVF 
procedure the eggs are surgically removed from a donor woman, fertilized in-
vitro with the 'husband's' sperm to create embryos that are placed into the 
'wife's' womb. 
Surrogate Motherhood (SM) 
Most commonly, SM involves a 'surrogate' mother gestating a genetic mother's 
embryo - either because pregnancy is medically contra-indicated for the genetic 
mother, or in order to save her the labour of pregnancy and birth. This is most 
commonly achieved by in-vitro fertilization of the 'wife' and 'husband's' 
gametes, followed by implantation of the resultant embryo into the womb of the 
surrogate-mother, who then carries the fetus to term, and if the agreement is 
honoured, hands over the baby to its genetic parents after birth. (See Morris, 
1988 for a discussion of custody disputes in surrogacy arrangements.) 
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A variant of this involves the artificial insemination of the surrogate 
mother by the 'husband's' sperm. In such cases the surrogate mother is the 
genetic mother and the 'wife' is the social mother. 
Surrogate embryo transfer (SET) 
Similarly, this involves the artificial insemination of a fertile woman with the 
sperm of an infertile woman's partner. In this case, however, the resultant 
embryo is "flushed" from the donor woman's body (a technique called "lavage") 
and placed in the uterus of the infertile woman. 
Sex-selection 
This involves the detection, by amniocentesis, of the sex of the fetus, and 
selective abortion if the fetus is not of the gender desired by its parents. 
Sex pre-selection 
II we possess a variety of emerging techniques for sex pre-selection before 
conception either through artificial separation of adrogenic and gynogenic sperm 
and subsequent fertilization by artificial insemination, or by timing the 
occurrence of intercourse and making use of functional differences between the 
two types of sperm." (Nentwig, 1981, p.185) 
Ectogenesis (Artificial wombs) 
This refers to the gestation of a fetus entirely outside of a human body. (See 
Rowland, 1985, for a feminist discussion.) 
[In response to a recent article describing an "early human pregnancy in vitro 
utilizing an artificially perfused uterus" (Bulleti, et al., 1988) appearing in 
Fertility and Sterility, the editor comments: 
"This fascinating study is the first report of an early human 
pregnancy attained in an in vitro model. Although the authors 
received approval for their study by their Ethical Review Board in 
Bologna, Italy, it should be noted that the serious ethical and legal 
concerns involved would not permit this experimentation in the United 
States." (p.995)] 
Cloning 
A technique bypassing sexual reproduction, in which a new individual is created 
with a genetic constitution which is identical to that of the parent of the 
original cell nucleus. (See Herlands, 1981, for a more detailed discussion.) 
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APPENDIX I 
TYPICAL INTERVIEW FORMAT: NURSING SISTER 
Married? 
Produce certificate? 
Married how long? 
Children from marriage - how many? 
Children from extra-marital relationships? 






Re: Housing : 
Where staying? 
Owned or rented? 
How many occupants? 
Number of rooms? 
Who sleeps/cooks where? 
Re: Substances 
Smoke? 
Drink I dagga? 








TYPICAL INTERVIEW FORMAT: SOCIAL WORKER 
Introductory explanation vis-a-vis certain criteria to be met; that information 
gathered is relayed to a team who then make a decision; "we can't help 
everybody." 
Date of birth? (Both partners) 
Family background? (Where grew up I family structure I relationships with 





Job type? Salary? Previous employment? 
How far educated? Aspirations? 
How did they meet? Courtship? Happily married? 
("non-verbals") 






Where? What? Rented? Other occupants? Own room? 
Cooking arrangements? 
Living expenses - rent, electricity, water 
Insured? Debts? Savings? How much? 
Which church? Frequency of contact? 
Alcohol (tends only to ask husband) 
Family pressure for fertility I Self-motivated? 
(note: only asks this of Black applicants) 
How motivated for baby? Has infertility led to marital tension? 
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APPENDIX III 
FICTITIOUS CASE PRESENTED TO DOCTOR AND SOCIAL WORKER 
Mr and Mrs K. are a Xhosa couple, aged 32 and 27 respectively, who have 
approached Groote Schuur Hospital requesting assistance in bearing children. 
They have been living together for eight years, during which time they have been 
involuntarily childless. Despite this, they married two years ago by 
traditional Xhosa rites. Mrs K has never had children, but Mr K has a ten year 
old daughter from a previous relationship; she is cared for by his parents in 
King Williamstown, and he does not supply maintenance. 
Mrs K is employed at a hospital, earning R250 per month. Mr K was last 
permanently employed in panelbeating in 1987. He has been unable to secure a 
steady job since then, but on a casual basis he fixes electrical appliances 
which brings in about R100 per month, though he admits this is erratic. 
The couple live in Side C, Khayalitsha, sharing a two-roomed zinc 
with Mrs K's brother. They occupy one of the rooms, in which they 
cooking. Living expenses include R30 rent and R80 for food each month. 
bungalow 
do their 
The couple report that despite certain conflicts in their relationship they 
love each other and are committed to having children. Asked about their areas 
of conflict, it turns out that about four years ago, Mr K had another lover. On 
discovering this, Mrs K returned to live with her parents (in Guguletu) for a 
year, after which she returned to him as he promised to never see the other 
woman again. However, she admits to still being suspicious that he is secretly 
meeting with her, despite his reassurance. There is still antipathy between 
Mrs K and his in-laws around this issue. Mr K reports episodes during which she 
"behaves strangely and out-of-control" and has "fits". 
Collateral from Pinelands Neuroclinic describes a six-week in-patient 
admission in 1987 with diagnosis of "hysterical conversion", related to family 
and marital stresses. 
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APPENDIX IV 
INTERVIEW WITH DOCTOR AND SOCIAL WORKER 
I/V How was the selection process (for infertility treatment) developed? 
Dr I think obviously it was an evolutionary process ... it was not that somebody 
sat down and said "let's make the criteria", ... its ... I don't know ... you, 
see I took over the unit about three years ago ... basically the amount of 
kids was not a criteria then ... being married was a kind of loose 
criteria ... age of 40 was then already ... you know, there was nothing 
formalised ... no strict guidelines ... you could decide- if you want to treat 
the patient, that's fine ... and of course the problem was then that there 
were several doctors also working part-time in the clinic ... and you know 
the private guys, they trust anybody ... whether they've got 12 kids or no 
kids ... or whether they are psychologically or physically ill- it didn't 
make any difference - in private everybody gets treated. And so it was a 
big muddle. And the bigger problem was that once we started having a 
little bit more structured infertility treatment, especially IVF, where you 
really need a reliable patient, we came to find that actually lots of our 
patients were socially completely unacceptable ... you know, really, you know 
they came from the darkest backgrounds you could imagine. And of course 
nobody ever looked into that. And then, with IVF - which I think was the 
initiator of all of that - with a long waiting list we just couldn't cope, 
because basically there was one person doing IVF. we said look we 
structure that somehow and have selection criteria of patients, and have to 
put it on a kind of a sound footing. 
Especially where the whole thing costs a lot of money and you had to 
be responsible to other departments who accused you of wasting money on a 
luxury like IVF. So you must be able to defend yourself and say: "Look, 
I've got very very strict selection criteria, and these are the only types 
of patients I'm treating". And so this all started about 2 years ago, 
where we became very strict and there were just masses of patients 
descending on us. And that's how it started ... basically I sat there ... we 
had a meeting with the Sister, and Prof. Davies there asked what we should 
do, and I gave him the criteria, and that's basically how it all started. 
I/V So you basically got the ball rolling in that area? 
Dr Ja, sure, because I mean there was just no control. And then of course, 
one and a half to two years ago we got the social worker in, which was also 
a major advantage, that we also could look into the social backgrounds of 
patients which before, look everybody did it on his own little steam, you 
know; speaks to the patients and says "Hey, are you O.K. or are you not 
O.K.?" But there was nothing structured there, so since then we're getting 
slowly more and more involved with the patients to look into their 
backgrounds. And this is one of the reasons why you [to the interviewer] 
possibly will slot into that as well ... but that will be just a widening of 
that whole investigation that we do of the patient before we treat 
them. 
And that has saved us a helluva lot of trouble, and a helluva lot of waste 
of investigation ... that we only accept patients who are highly motivated, 
who fit our criteria- which are strict, I admit ... but I think we are 
still very liberal in many terms, especially financial terms, because 
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people who say "No, you must make a m1n1mum salary or something", which I 
have constantly refused because I don't want to make it money-dependent. 
Firstly, because there's the so-called informal sector - you never know how 
much income there is really; and secondly there 18 are other population 
groups who live with much less money, maybe more happily than we do with 
more money. So that should not really be a criteria. 
But all the other criteria which now evolved more or less by the social 
worker - like housing should be O.K., there should be no addiction to drugs 
or alcohol or whatever, and intermarital relationships should be O.K .... 
you know, that only evolved over the last year or so. Especially 
Suzanna went more into that. And that's how it came about basically. 
And then, of course, these meetings which started because we felt - before 
I just made decision and finished. I agree it's still very often like 
that, that I do ... I've got the final say very often, as you can probably 
see in the meetings, you know nobody want to say really, and I say "O.K., 
yay or nay? Anybody for or against it?" But basically it should be a 
group decision, it should not be a single decision, by a single person, 
whether we treat a person or not. Also, I think the patient feels treated 
fairer like this. It's also not the Sister, in the 23 Clinic, who says no, 
so if she's got a problem she brings it to the meeting, and we discuss it 
and say "shall we take them or not?" So it's a group decision. So, the 
group is relatively narrow. There're not enough people from ... uh ... fringe 
24 specialities, but still you know, its what we can muster at the moment. 
I think that's how it evolved, basically. 
I/V OK, you've mentioned that you've had increasing numbers of 
applying ... and that you can't treat everybody ... 
people 
Dr It's not so much anymore. There was an initial mountain that came to us, 
but I think we've been through it. Now it's a steady stream. So it's 
still more than we can cope with but it's not the masses of patients we had 
before, because it's mainly because of selection ... stricter selection. 
I/V And you also mentioned that you need to be accountable to certain people 
who put pressure on you to justify why you're treating certain people. 
Dr It's basically all the critics of infertility programs ... 
IV Who are they? ... 
Dr And there are plenty: Family Planning, Community Health, Preventative 
Medicine, other hospital departments like the guys who do the financing up 
in the prefabs ... OK ... a lot of critics because they think IVF is a luxury 
they cannot afford ... or infertility is a luxury which nobody can afford 
here in S.A. -and I don't agree with them ... ! think it's a disease, that 
must be treated, but of course they think differently ... it's the same way 
they attach other medical specialities like open heart surgery. Everybody 
has to defend their speciality, but I think I've got a very strong point. 
Look, there are lots of critics, no questions, but by being strict in your 
selection criteria, and also by showing them that the more advanced 
infertility treatments like IVF are financed by the patients, we've 
actually got a very strong point against all these critics. 
Because IVF and AID and all that is financed by these patients, and the 
rest is just a routine ... sub-clinic of gynae outpatients. 
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I/V So those are factors outside of the actual criteria themselves - the fact 
that you're under quite a lot of pressure; you've got a large number of 
applicants ... 
Dr You see in principal it should be the patient themselves who decide on 
their own whether they have a child or not - it shouldn't be you. I mean 
who am I to decide whether somebody else wants to have a child or not?? 
And in principle, if somebody comes and says "look we've got 3 kids and 
would like to have another one", it's not really up to me to go and say 
"look, hey, this is not OK and this is not alright, and we cannot do it". 
So this is only born out of a kind of emergent situation ... that we have to 
find a way of coping with patients. 
I/V Does that mean that you feel some discomfort with making rules? 
Dr Oh yes, very much so, very much so. 
I/V Do you feel it's not a completely clear situation? 
Dr No, I mean it's just not my duty to say, as a doctor, "I can treat you, or 
not", because she's got a problem- or that couples got a problem and 
that's why they're coming to me. It's really not up to me to say "hey, 
that problems non-existent because you've got 2 kids already". And its 
mainly the amount of kids that comes into it - all the other ones one can 
talk about. Only if she's got a medical disease is it my duty to advise 
her "hey, it's no good for you to fall pregnant". But on grounds that 
she's got 2 children to tell her "hey, look you mustn't have another 
child" ... it's actually not my duty, it's not up to me to decide, it's up 
to them to decide. So, with that I feel very uncomfortable, but I'm pushed 
into that situation, it's not that I want to be there. 
I/V Pushed by ... ? The system? 
Dr By the system ... by what I've got available. And I must make criteria that 
I can take those patients, who according to these criteria need our help 
most. How you come to that decision - who needs our help most? - I mean 
that's the battle. But that's the system we build up in. And I think its 
more or less fair under the prevailing situation. But its definitely by 
far not perfect or by far not satisfactory. In principle everybody wants 
to have a child, OK, that's their business, I mean they can have a child. 
If nothing would be wrong with them, they would take the decision anyway . 
.. So there, that part, I feel very uncomfortable about. 
I/V So it sound like you don't perceive it as a perfect situation? 
Dr No, definitely no, no. 
I/V OK, do you think we could go now into looking at what the different 
criteria are? 
Dr Where do you want to start? I think marriage ... this is a big ... you see 
this is not one of my criteria, that a couple must be married. The Human 
Issue Act states that: Couple must be married for AID, for IVF, 
GIFT ... everything that is a little bit more advanced: the couple must be 
married. It would be stupid now to have one type of patient - this is just 
from a practicality point of view - which you treat until a certain point, 
and then you stop because you cannot do it, because you're not allowed to 
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do it. So I think it's probably better to say right from the beginning 
"look we can only take a couple who is married". Because I agree 10 years 
together and they don't get married for their personal reasons, but they're 
intent to stay together for the rest of their lives, they can be perfectly 
good parents - why should they not have a child? But because here we are 
in the public eye in a provincial hospital where we have to send returns in 
every year to the Inspector of Anatomy, I cannot treat anybody who is not 
married. Otherwise you've got a kind of a two-tiered system: Here you've 
got patients, they get this kind of treatment, they're not married; here 
you've another type of patient who is married and there we can go further. 
And then of course, it's going to be an absolute nightmare. Fortunately, 
the requests are very few and inbetween. But, I think in principle it's 
better to have criteria right at the beginning and say "look, as for 
advanced treatment of infertility, I cannot treat you, or let's just not 
start investigating unless you're married." And I think also, in a way, it 
fits in the conservative environment of South Africa. Attitudes here, I 
feel, are more conservative than in Europe - concerning marriage, living 
together, premarital intercourse, and all that kind of thing - they',re very 
much more conservative here than they are in the States or Europe, or 
Germany where I come from. It's much more liberal there. I personally 
have got nothing against is, but I think it fits in the conservative 
climate of S.A. And up to now we've had great problems with that. 
Occasionally we had problems where we had lesbian couples coming in. And 
that was our easy way out - in all of that- we'd say "look, you're not 
married, we cannot treat you". Simple. So it was a kind of shield to push 
in front of you though its actually not the reason why you don't want to 
treat them. It's just because yourself you feel a bit uncomfortable or 
threatened by it, so that's why you don't want it. So you've got something 
else you've got that you can put in front of you. 
So there it became a major problem because they'd say "Ay, man, why not?" 
But there, especially AID, it states, you must have somebody who is 
married. So there you just cannot do it. 
I/V So if is were up to you, it sounds as though there are still certain cases 
where you would feel uncomfortable about treating: gay couples ... 
Dr Gay couples I would feel very uncomfortable ... because you see, I try to 
put a motive in front of all what we are thinking about when we make a 
decision about whether we should treat a couple or not: Is the environment 
conducive to child education? It's an extremely difficult decision. A gay 
couples even more difficult. I don't mind if somebody's 18 or 20 years old 
and they make a decision - "I want to be gay" that's fine, it's 
everybody's prerogative. But, to grow up in an environment like that, I 
don't know, I feel just a bit ... reluctant ... I don't want to be part of 
it. It's my personal thing. But they can go into private I mean they do 
it there, I know that and it's fine with me. I just feel personally a bit 
uneasy about it. 
I/V And single parents? Single mothers? 
Dr Now you're asking me personal questions, you know. I think probably the 
same applies as to lesbians. I don't think AB INITIO single parents should 
be there. If it happens to be like that in the end, you know, there was a 
couple who were together and they went apart and now she or he is a single 
parent ... no that's just par for the course. That's just bad luck, because 
the relationship didn't work out. But to start AB INITIO with something 
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like that I don't feel quite right. Maybe there also I'm a bit old 
fashioned, but ~ think that a child should get a world picture which 
contains mother and father, and these two are supposed to stay together ... ! 
mean its ... I would feel uneasy about it. So I'm actually quite happy 
about the marriage being in the law, though there are some patients I would 
say it's not indicated - we could treat them anyway, because they've got a 
very good relationship, they've stayed together ... for instance they might 
not get married for 74 tax purposes ... something like that ... or they're 
already together for 10 years ... I wouldn't see any reason why we 
shouldn't treat them. 
I/V So if it was a stable relationship ... a heterosexual relationship 
then you'd be happy. OK, that's marriage ... 
Dr Age? 
I/V Age under 40? 
Dr Ja, age is basically for medical reasons. Look, as you've probably seen, 
there's not such a strict cut-off point. We've got patients who are 
40 ... 41 ... I've got one patient who's pregnant who is 42. The problem is 
for the mother, if she's got pregnancy complications diabetes, 
hypertension, and so on, a higher chance of getting it, operative 
delivery ... And then of course, abnormalities in the baby- above the age 
of 38 increase quite significantly. I think if one counsels the woman 
properly, tells her what risk she's undergoing; and then once she's 
pregnant needs amniocentesis and genetic counselling for the risk of 
abnormality ... and she understands it very well ... then I think one can well 
go ahead and treat somebody above the age of 40. And we've done that in 
the past. 
I/V So you're saying amniocentesis and ultrasound should be a back-up? 
Dr Ja the amniocentesis ... they all need genetic counseling, and they all must 
be aware that they need amniocentesis around the 14th or 16th week of their 
pregnancy ... 
I/V When you say 'all', do you mean all treated patients for infertility, or do 
you mean all patients over 40. 
Dr Above the age of 38, actually. To make sure it's a normal baby. And they 
must be aware of what risks they run. And if they know, then it's OK, then 
I've got no strict ... that's the weakest of all the criteria. 
I/V So what makes it flexible, in a sense ... what would sway you either way? 
Dr If the patient still has regular cycles - that means she's still ovulatory 
at age 40 - and she has definite reasons why she didn't fall pregnant 
before -we get pretty often a career woman coming in ... they get married 
late ... and now suddenly the panic comes in ... she's 38 or 39 and: "it's 
getting late now, I must have a child" I've got no problems with treating 
them. But sometimes you get patients who have been treated for 15 years at 
various institutions for infertility - I think there that at age 38 you 
should say "maybe that's enough now". Because you see patients who walk 
around - they've maybe been to Tygerberg for 5 years, go to private for a 
few more, and then they come here and we start all over again. But it's a 
weak criteria - it's just a recommendation really. 
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I/V What about the prospective father's age? 
Dr That doesn't really come into it very much because if you look from a 
medical point of view, we look just at the sperm. If there it's good 
enough, that's fine. And if they're happy with that ... it's OK. Because 
that is very much a personal thing... OK maybe he can't play football 
with his son, but maybe he can give other things. The main thing he must 
give is affection and that's not really age related. So from the father 
point of view, age doesn't really play a part. 
[Interviewer suggests calling the Social Worker to remind her of this 
meeting, as she is now a half an hour late and may have forgotten to 
come. Dr W does so.] 
I/V Less than 2 children unless they're all genetically related to one partner. 
Dr Less than 2 kids. That's something that's been born out of an emergent 
situation, that we've got restricted means and we have to define those 
patients who seem to need it most ... and what easier thing to say than 
those who have got no children. And the other thing, of course, is the 
recommendation by the World Health Organisation of zero growth. . .. But 
basically it's out of a situation of restricted means. we've got only a 
few people working, so we cannot treat anybody. 
I/V So if say there are two kids and they're genetically related to 
say the husband or the wife and are not of the union, then you 
consider treating? 
Dr No. If each of them has one child from a previous relationship, we will 
not treat. If one of the partners has no kids, then we would see that as a 
possible exception. Maybe it's also very simplistic to think about, but I 
think everybody, somehow, should have that experience to have a child, male 
or female,. And if one of the partners has not had that, then I think 
there's something definitely missing. So if one of the partners has had no 
kind, I think this is an exception. Even if the partner has 2 kids. 
I/V Do you think it is important for people to have the experience of being 
biological parents? Genetically have their own offspring? 
Dr I think so. That's where it comes in as a possible exception that 
somebody never had a child. 
I/V Is there a problem if one of the partners hasn't had a child, and the other 
has had say 3, 4, 5 or 6 ... a large number of children ... does that create 
a different situation? 
Dr Ja, I think if there are many children coming in then it may create another 
situation, because then the social thing comes in - can they afford to have 
another child? How is the housing? ... this is where the social worker 
comes in very strongly. If they can look after 6 kids, OK! With a little 
bit of a push, I would say yes, OK, why not? - because he never had a 
child, or she never had a child. As long as they're very well looked 
after, and that particular partner has shown that they would be a very good 
partner, I see no reason to say no. 
I/V Then I've got other criteria here that I suppose involves 
[i.e. the Social Worker] - so maybe we should wait for her. 








disability grants. There was one case where both parents were on D.G.'s 
What's the policy there? 
Dr No policy, but I think the general feeling is ... and it's more what 
everybody feels and thinks ... is that if somebody's already on a disability 
grant, and they have a child now, I mean this child must now have a 
maintenance grant. I think it's probably going to make their social 
situation worse. And ... 
[A knock at the door. The Social Worker enters apologetically, is welcomed, and 
oriented to the discussion topic]. 
Dr I just told Steve that the general feeling is that if both partners are on 
a disability grant already and have a child, the child would need a 
maintenance grant... It would be unfair to the community. It would 
probably make their social situation worse. And so, in general, we have 
been very reluctant. 
I/V So are you saying it would be a burden on the community in some way? 
Dr In some way, and to themselves as well, because these disability grants are 
ridiculously small. 
sw Like, with a maintenance grant they will pay for just one child, maybe 
the second one. And say, for instance, they do have more children, 
will have less money in the end. 
[The 'fictitious case' is presented to the interviewees.] 
for 
they 
I/V So the question is how, looking at that case and imagining them coming for 
treatment, what would the rationale be for deciding whether to treat or 
not? For what reasons. I've laid it out fairly systematically, so maybe 
we could go through it point by point. 
SW The interesting thing about Xhosa maintenance - I found out yesterday, they 
explained to me yesterday - is that due to their tradition it's not 
necessary to pay a monthly maintenance ... 
Dr - A one off -
SW for their children. They just pay like six cows or something like 
that, or an amount like six hundred or four hundred rand once. And then 
they're free! (laughs) 
Dr That's actually a big problem you know, because many of these old Xhosa 
rites - which are excellent customs - have been converted, or should we say 
have degenerated. For example, before: if you give somebody 6 cows for 
maintenance, this means that this child is looked after by these 6 cows ... 
SW - For the rest of his life -
Dr ... basically, for the rest of his life. Six cows- I mean they give meat 
and calves and things like that. It's capital which appreciates. But now, 
if they give 6 hundred bucks and that's gone after 2 months, that child is 
hungry. And that's a big, big, problem, and it's where you get 
intermingling of Xhosa and Zulu customs - which I also know very well 
because I worked up there for 4 and a half years - intermingling with kind 
of Western tradition or what, you know, where a cow gets replaced by money 
because there's no grazing for cows. It's a short-term lucrative thing for 
the grandparents, but in the long term it means nothing. And 
actually a very big problem you know, and this once off maintenance 




SW So the children before the marriage that we're looking at this is 
something that we more or less don't have to take into consideration 
really. On the father's side, it would be the same - who she had the child 
from would do the same thing. OK, in this case the mother is employed, 
earning R250 a month. And the father last was employed in 1987. Now this 
is something - for the husband I must say - that we do not accept. Because 
he's got to have a permanent job. 
I/V What about the fact that he does work at home fixing radios, etc? 
not considered? 
SW No, that's not stable income. 
Dr You cannot feed a family on that. 
That's 
SW · ·He's got to have a stable income which gives him the opportunity to have 
unemployment money so say he would lose his job and needed to find 
another one. For six months he could go on his unemployment money, It's 
not as much as his salary, but it's something to go on. And if he should 
become sick or anything, he's still got his sick benefits. So it's better 
for him to have a permanent job. He can always earn extra money with this 
casual employment in his spare time. 
I/V And the fact that she's earning money at the moment? 
not seen as a mitigating factor? 
SW No. 
[Peruses 'living arrangements'] 
Is that 
SW There're not too many people from 2-roomed places ... Is this now a two 
bedroomed place or just a kitchen and a room? 
I/V Let's say 2 roomed. 
SW Well, in the first instance there, they're sharing ... Oh no, they're ... 





in a room where they're doing their cooking. That's not 
They've got to have a separate cooking facility. I don't 
cooking in the same room where they and the baby or they and 
are sleeping. 
I/V Why is that? What is the reason for that? 
sw I don't think it's very healthy, (laughs) do you think it's good? 
cooking on primus stoves and things like that ... 
Dr Danger factor. 
SW Ja. 
they're 
Dr That's why we get all the burns in Red Cross Hospital, because they cook in 
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the same room where the kids are sleeping. If that thing explodes, the 
paraffin goes all over the place. 
SW Some of them are using gas bottles ... 
I/V OK. so it's dangerous and also unhygienic. 
SW I don't mind them just having 2 rooms, like a bedroom and a kitchen. They 
must have separate cooking facilities. They either stay in with someone, 
and their house is not overcrowded ... the couples got to have a bedroom on 
their own and they've got to have separate cooking facilities - never mind 
if they're sharing these with others in the house. 
I/V Does that mean that if you had a very crowded house, and say there are 2 
couples in one room, and they still had a separate kitchen, that's not 
acceptable? 
SW No, I don't think if they are on the program that it's advisable to share 
the room with another couple. I don't know ... Dr Wiswedel can bear me 
out ... I don't think so. 
Dr No, I don't think so [i.e. agreeing with her] 
SW I don't accept that. 
I/V For what sort of reasons? 
SW Well, I think for any normal couple, being on the program - doctor will 
explain to you more about the program! (laughing) -
Dr I mean you don't want somebody living in overcrowded conditions. 
sw And I mean it's not only overcrowded, I think they're in a way 
there's 2 married couples sharing a bedroom. I don't think it's a 
situation at all. 
tense if 
healthy 
I/V So there are kind of emotional factors that you're implying ... that they're 
under stress and need space of their own. Urn ••• but then there's also 
overcrowding, and a feeling that that's not ... 
Dr But fortunately we very rarely see 2 couples living in one room. 
SW I've got one case that I saw where there were 3 couples living in one room 
in double bunks. So you do get them. 
I/V So - I just have to play dumb - I mean I'm just going to pretend I don't 
understand what you're saying! (laughs) OK? What it is about overcrowding 
that you see as the problem? 
Dr There are kids there as well, you know ... 
SW I don't think that they can be really relaxed in that room, honestly. 
Dr Also, to bring up a child there, to educate a child there in a room where 2 
or 3 couples are and some kids ... it falls under that thing of 'conducive 
to child education'. The child's going to be pushed in a corner, you know. 
I/V OK. 
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SW Living expenses (looking at the case again) ... If I can tell you that rent 
of R30, they must have a very smart house in the Black areas - they pay R6 
RB for a house. RBO for food each month ... is that enough for 2 people 
to live on? 
They do live on this if ... I dunno ... maybe mealie meal is not so 
expensive. 
I/V Put it this way: in what way would these amount become relevant in your 
assessment? 
SW Well in the Black areas they don't pay more than ... I haven't seen anybody 
staying in a brick house paying more than about R20 a month, and then it's 
a 2 or a 3 bedroomed place. When they're staying in ... you know, like a 
shack, they're not even paying rent. And normally when they're having a 
place in the backyard of somebody else - a small brick house or something 
like that it's 6, 8, 10 to 15 rand rent. They do live on RBO a month food 
but I don't think that that's ... 
I/V I've noticed though from watching some of the interviews that you sort of 
assess how they manage money: are they cautious?, do they save? So the 
whole way they manage their finances is quite important ... 
SW -Yes, it's important to me too. Because they've got to make some kind of 
a provision for that child's future. Say for instance that child want to 
go and learn in a school, it must have the opportunity to go and do so. 
That's why I'm asking about things like insurance. Dis vir hulle ... how 
can I put it in Afrikaans now ... vir hulle menswaaardigheid ... hulle 
lewenskwaliteit, moet daarna kyk [translated: it's for their quality of 
life). And I'm also looking- he's in a job- and I try to find out: is 
he going to get increases, what's his changes of getting a better position. 
That too. The future. I mean, everything's getting more expensive now. 
Now maybe they can live on his salary now, but maybe next year they can't, 
so .. 
I/V So you're looking for some kind of economic stability. 
SW Yes. They must be ... 
I/V -So that ties up with the husband being employed ... OK. 
SW [Looking at the case again.) 
Now when I find something like this, that there was a third or a fourth 
person involved in the marriage relationship, I don't accept them 
immediately. I try to refer them to FAMSA, or if I have time - which is 
more or less never! (laughing) - try to counsel them on their marriage 
problems ... just to make sure that the marriage is stable. Because I had a 
case now, I cancelled them - I phoned Peter [one of the doctors on the 
team) and asked him to take them off the program. I referred them because 
the husband had had dagga problems and they had marriage problems. I 
thought, I had an idea that he was beating her and carrying on. But 
they did not confirm this in the interview, and I still referred them 
because I just had a feeling it was there. And they bluffed FAMSA, and 
they bluffed the drug counselling people and they gave me a good report 
that everything was fine. And then on the program - about 6 weeks or 2 
months ago we accepted them - and the same thing occurred again. 
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Dr He beat her up again. 
SW He just beat her up again because he started to smoke dagga again, and when 
he got home he was upset about something and he beat her up. And she 
decided to divorce him now. And she moved away from him and everything and 
she doesn't want to go on with the marriage now. So this is what's making 
it very difficult for me - I've just got their word and other people's 
reports. There's nowhere for me to see for myself. And I've got to accept 
that, and I feel very unsafe because of that. 
I/V So, again I'm going to play ignorant: 
relationship seen as important? 
What ... Why is the marital 
sw Well, it's to give the child security. If the parents don't have a 
relationship, there won't be lots of love or security or anything in 
house for the child. I think it's important for the child to know 




I/V Right. So, if you get wind of an extramarital relationship, does that make 
you very hesitant, or ... ? 
SW I won't say "no, never" (laughs) I would say "just go and try and see if 
you can sort this out", by referring them to an organisation like FAMSA. 
[Peruses the case again.} 
You see, in a case like this with a marriage situation like this I would 
refer them and say "come back in six months time", and I would reassess 
them. And if I'm not happy I would refer them to come back in another six 
month's time. But if it's really a problem that I think can't be sorted 
out I will in any case give them the benefit of the doubt ... give them a 
chance. 
[Examines the case again.] 
[Reading aloud]: "Mrs K reports episodes during which she behaves strangely 
and out of control and has fits ... " There I would ask for an assessment 
from the psychiatric people ... 
Dr - Ja. -
SW to sort of give us a clue. 
I/V And what is the general feeling as personality problems or psychological 
stroke - psychiatric issues? 
Dr I mean, infertility treatment is very stressful, so you must have a more or 
less stable personality. If there's something in the history ... there was 
something went wrong, like hysterical conversion where they cannot cope 
with the stresses, where they take refuge into hysterical conversion. If 
that's the case, then there you make a big question- what's going to 
happen if she's going to go on IVF? 
SW And say for instance, what's going to happen if she's got a baby with 
cholic? 
Dr Ja. 3 o'clock in the morning, temperature of 39,5 and screaming. 
SW Exactly. 
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Dr So there one needs psychiatric assessment. Well of course, you have by 
purpose chosen lots of points -
I/V - Of course, ja. -
Dr Which all fit in the grey area. 
sw Ja. 
I/V Sure, I mean that's to give us a base to-
Dr And, on each of these points, if you take each point isolated, you might 
say look with everything else OK it would be alright. But if you take them 
all together you say no. I mean that bucket is now full, you see. Like 
you can fill a bucket in one big full swoop, or drop by drop. And 
here I would say you've got lots of drops together - I wouldn't accept that 
patient, speaking in total. 
I/V So you tend to take an overview. 
SW Ja, I would never accept a case like this. 
I/V [Looking at the case again.] 
sw 
OK. there's also the fact that they've been living together we spoke 
about marriage earlier - for 8 years and they got married by Xhosa rites a 
few years ago. Urn ... 
It's interesting how 
Society they're living 
get married in court". 
Xhosa rites. 
many of those people now, because of the Western 
in ... "well, it's different now, we're going to 
But they are married about 8 years now I think by 
Dr You sure, in my opinion there is if they come here to Cape Town and they 
live permanently in Cape Town and they want to be treated in in Cape Town, 
I think they should be married in court because it gives the wife so much 
more security. Xhosa rites provide nothing, absolutely zilch. So if you 
are married in court it gives the wife security and it gives the child 
security, and that's what we actually want, alright. And that's why Xhosa 
rites I'm not happy with. If they really want to be together there's no 
sweat to get married in court. Simple thing - costs R35 or something. 
SW - It costs RS -
Dr RS. It costs nothing, really. If they want to be together, it's no sweat, 
and it's a commitment of the husband to the wife. The other thing is, if 
they come from the Transkei and they want to be treated by Western 
Medicine, I think they should adapt a little bit to the rules. That we 
actually want in return a little bit of stability on that side and a little 
bit of security on that side. That's what concerns me, these types of 
marriages, because here in these types of marriages which I know 
prevented Xhosa rites here means the husband can do anything, and the wife 
has got no security whatsoever. And I don't accept that, because that did 
not exist in old Zulu or Xhosa customs. There the wife was very well 
looked after by the family; and this does not really exist in Western 
Society where also the wife is fairly secure, and it gets more and more. 
But they try to get inbetween, and I've got no sympathies there. They try 






at their disposal ... what power they 






SW It's the same thing with their housing here. They very easily tell me: 
"we've got a big house in the Ciskei or Transkei", but in the meantime 
she's staying here with the husband and just going - and then I always ask 
now who is in this house - yes, her husband's family or something. So, 
that I don't accept. I don't accept good housing in Transkei or Ciskei. 
That's ... "dis 'n ekstra" [that's an extra] (laughs) "wat in kom" [that 
comes in]. They've got to have good housing here, because she's going to 
stay here most of the time. 
Dr I think, finally what one must say and what one always must be aware of: 
We're not telling them they mustn't fall pregnant. Nobody says that. We 
will not tell them "look, you mustn't have a child". Because we say, "look 
we've got so much at our disposal, we cannot help everybody, and we must 
select somehow". We are pushed into that situation. It's not that we 
really elevate ourselves onto a plateaux where we can say, "OK, you, you're 
a nice chap, we can treat you". Alright, one gets pushed into that 
situation, so we must make some kind of selection. 
I/V OK, so on the basis of that, that you need to select along certain lines, 
what do you think the overall value is that is contained in these criteria? 
What do you think the overall aim of choosing these criteria is? 
Dr I've told you before, an environment conducive to child education. 
And, then safety and security. 
SW They must have ... quality of life in a way. 
OK? 
Dr And, I mean when it comes to having a child it's not a matter of prestige 
or confirmation of manhood or something like that. 
SW The child must have a chance, if he's got the ability. 
IV So that's the question of motivation - what's motivating a couple to 
and request a baby. And in certain cases you get a bit unsure 





Dr And, in general, why do people want to have a child? That's an open 
question. Ask anybody "why do you want to have a child?" There's no 
answer to that. There's no answer to that, 'why do you want to have a 
child?'. This is the urge to procreate ... to be still there after you are 
dead, you know in your child. I mean, who knows? Nobody knows why you 
want to have a child. But sometimes motivation is a little bit 
questionable. The guy who wants 8 kids you know, only that increases his 
prestige in the social environment. And very often women think that if 
they've got no children they've got no social standing. Bit I think that's 
a different matter - that's a cultural think, which has crept in there. 
But otherwise the question 'why does somebody want to have a child?' I 
don't think anyone can really answer. I mean, why do animals procreate? I 
dunno! 
SW And in the Moslem society, the wife is scared the husband will leave her 
and go to a woman who can give him children. 
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I/V Are there cases where you worry, as a social worker, about people's 
motivation? 
SW Ja, when there's a lot of pressure from the husband's family or something-
it's not a healthy situation. I would go in deeper to find out -
Dr Ja, very often you get it that they say "either, you get a child or I 
sw 
divorce you". Then one gets very reluctant. Because he's actually not 
with that woman together because he wants her as his wife, as his companion 
for life. That means that the oath he sweared, whilst he was standing in 
the magistrate's office - they want to be together for life - actually is 
not true. 
Well then I query the marriage relationship immediately. If he 
married that wife to have a child, then their marriage relationship 
really what it should be. 
only 
isn't 
I/V OK. Can I ask one more question. Klaus was saying earlier that he feels 
some discomfort about the process of having to say "you: yes, and you: no". 
Do you experience it similarly? 
SW Yes, I experience it similarly, but another experience that I have is that 
some of the people really do not qualify to be parents. But I mean how can 
I - it's only a decision that I'm making now. And that's why I really feel 
at the moment that I'm skating on thin ice (laughs). I'm not feeling 
really safe. 
Dr The thing is, if there were nothing wrong with them, nobody would ask them? 
They would just do it. 
I/V They would just go ahead. 
SW That's right. There are people who are acceptable without being referred 
to me. It's the queries that are coming through to me, I accept that. 
I/V Right. Well, thanks a lot. 
Dr Where do you see the role of the psychologist? 
I/V Well. that's the big question mark. 
Dr I see a place. 
I/V Ja, urn ... 
SW For support. I should think I can become more involved. If I was only 
working on infertility -
Dr It could happen to all of us! (laughs) 
SW with support to the people. And, really I sort of screen them now, and 
that's more or less the last time I see them unless they come into 
hospital. And, that's not really ... you know, sometimes they come back and 
ask me some questions and they come and talk to me - 'nothing's happened 
yet', or something like that- and I just get the feeling that they do need 
to see me more often, not only for the screening. I'm not at all involved 
at the moment. And urn, I don't know, this is not really the role that I 
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create (laughs), but I could really do with a psychologist working side by 
side. 
Dr I think the very important role of the psychologist is where there are ... 
like AID and like what we do now - gamete donation or oocyte [egg] donation 
-where that comes is in I think you have to ... there you have to look very 
carefully into your couples, in order to find out whether they would 
withstand the stress of this burden, continuously for the rest of their 
lives. Often it doesn't appear like something, but I'm sure there's 
something there. 
SW Like on some of them I would really like to have IQ tests too (laughs), for 
brain ... what is it? ... brain damage IQ (laughs) 
INTERVIEW ENDS 
